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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
.AT RICIIMOND. 
Record No. 1777 
GLENS FALLS INDEMNITY COMPANY, Plaintiff in 
Error, 
versu.s 
RAY S. HARRIS, Defendant in Error. 
!I 
~-----
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR . 
. To the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, Glens Falls Indemnity Company, respect-
fully represents that it is greatly aggrieved by a final judg~ 
ment of the Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, 
pronounced on the 24th day of February, 1936, in an action at 
law, in which your petitioner was the defendant, and RayS. 
Harris was the plaintiff. 
Your petitioner will refer to itself as the defendant and 
to RayS. Harris as the plaintiff, such desig·nation of the par-
ties being in accordance with the respective positions oc-
cupied by them on the trial of the case. A duly authenti-
cated transcript of the record in this case and exhibits filed 
with the evidence are hereto attached and herewith presented 
as a part of this petition, and it is prayed that this p~tition 
and the said transcript of the record and exhibits be read 
together and treated as defendant's first brief on appeal. 
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PR·ELil\1INARY. 
The plaintiff instituted 11is notice of motion for damages 
alleg·ed to have been sustained by him on account of the fail-
ure of the defendant to fulfill and perform its contract of in-
surance. There was a verdict for th\3 plaintiff, Ray S. Harris, 
ag·ainst the Glens Falls Indemnity Company for $931.40, with 
interest from September 8, 1935, and costs, and it is to this 
judgment that this defendant prays that a writ of error and 
S1tpersedeas be awarded, and that said judgment be reversed 
and ·set aside, and that judgment be entered in this Court for 
petitioner. 
STATEl\1:ENT OF FACTS. 
On :J\IIay 23, 1930, Ray S. Harris, the plaintiff, was insured 
in a "Glens 1F'alls Income Accident Policy" with the Glens 
Falls Indemnity Company. This policy was renewed and was 
in force during the month of March, 1935. The policy was 
an accident policy and provided for weekly indemnity and 
certain hospital e~pe:ilse. The amount to which the plaintiff 
was entitled, if anything, is not in dispute, and it is admit-
ted that the amount of the judgment is correct if the plain-
tiff was entitled to recover. 
Pertinent provisions of the policy are as follows: 
''Glens Falls Indemnity Company of Glens Falls, New 
York. In considerat~on of the premium of Twelve and OOjlOO 
Dollars, and of the statements in the application for this 
policy. copy of which is endorsed hereon and made a part 
hereof, and subject to all the provisions and limitations here-
inafter contained and endorsed hereon, does hereby insure 
Ray S. Harris ~ • • Against loss, as hereinafter defined, 
resulting directly and independently of all other causes from 
nccidental bodily injuries, being hereinafter referred to as 
'~uch injury' <• • *.'' · 
"SCHEDULE II. 
"Total Loss of Time. Or, if 'such injury' shall not result 
in any of the losses mentioned in Schedule I, but shall cause 
continuous total disability, and prevent the Insured from. date. 
rd ar.ddent, from performing any and every duty p~rtaining 
to his occupa.tion the Company will pay him the weekly Ac-
rident indemnity above specified, for the period of such dis-
ability.'' 
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''Time of Notice of Claim. 4. Written notice of injury on 
which claim may be based _gms:t be given to the Company ~ 
'ljli,Jbin twenty days after the date of the accident causing such 
injury." · 
''Sufficiency of Notice. 5. Such notice given by or in be-
half of the Insured or beneficiary as the case may be, to the , ~ 
Company at Glens Falls, New York. or to any authori7.ed ~ 
agent of the Company, with particulars sufficient to identify 
the Insured, shall be deemed to be notice to the Company. 
Failure to give notice within the time provided in this policy 
shall not invalidate any claim if it shall be shown not to have / 
been reasonably possible to give such notice and that notice .,........ 
~en as soon as was ~easonabl'!J. possible.'' 
''IN JURIES NOT COVERED. 21. This policy does not 
cover any accidental bodily injury caused or contr~buted to, 
directly or indirectly, by sickness or disease, or by ptomaines .; 
or bacterial infections (except pyogenic infections which shall 
occur with and tlirough an accidental cut or wound)." 
Pertinent facts which are not in dispute are as follows: 
On March 28th or' March 29th, 1935, a short while after 
five o'clock P. 1\L, Ray S. Harris, the plaintiff, went to the 
Elks' Club in Lynchburg, Virginia. In a small room about 
8 x 9 feet, he saw several persons playing cards. He was 
standing at the entrance watching the card game. McHenry 
Pete.rs, · 'vho was a friend of the plaintiff and very strong, 
and was ''always doing a lot of horse play'' grabbed Har-
ris by the neck with such force that Harris tried to free 
himself, but could not do so, and remarked to Peters "not to 
cut my head off", and Peters released him. For a few min-
utes thereafter the plaintiff felt some little pain, but after 
he felt no pain .. _ He worked as usual on Saturday, and Satur-
day afternoon he went with Dr. Foster down to Dr. Foster's 
farm in the country. While on the farm he got hold of the 
roller which was used for rolling the lawn, and rolled a small 
spaee, and felt a stiffness in his neck for the first time. He 
consulted a physician on Tuesday and continued to work up 
until the afternoon of April 5th (that is for one week), at 
which time he went to the Memorial Hospital. He was not 
finally discharged from the hospital until June 14th. Poul-
tices were applied to his neck, and on April 9th, April 12th, 
and April 17th, operations were performed on the plaintiff, 
and during this time he was seriously ill. On May 8th he 
was permitted to leave the hospital, and on May 9th he was 
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~gain permitted to leave the hospital. At this time, he went 
to his office and got the policy of insurance, upon which 
this suit is based, and dictated a letter to Dr. Adkerson, 
his doctor, about the policy, and asked the doctor to notify 
~Iurrell Alexander, the agent. Dr .. Adkerson did not deliver 
this letter, nor was any notification ever given the Company, 
or its agent, until May 22, 1935, thirteen days later. Ray S. 
Harri,s: returned to work on July 8, 1935. 
T:he medical testimony showed that Mr. Harris was suffer-
ing from severe cellulitis, which, in this case, was a bac-
terial infection of the back of the neck. It is not disputed 
that the inf~ction 'vas a bacterial infection, 'vhich the doctors 
attributed to the fact that the neck was wounded or bruised by 
the grasp of Mr. Peters, and that infection got in and caused 
the trouble. The doctors also testified that the infection was 
pyogenic, which term describes infection attended by pus. 
The medical testimony was that the condition of the neck 
showed that it had been grasped with considerable force, such 
as would naturally produce a bruised wound, and that such 
bruise was the natural and probable result following the 
pressure on the tissue of the neck. The doctors further 
agreed that an infection such as followed in this case was in 
no way unusual and often followed. The medical testimony 
therefore attributed the cellulitis first to the bruising of the 
neek and then following that the infection. 
It is pertinent to note that both Doctors Devine and Adker-
son stated that they advised ~~r. Harris when he consulted 
them, that, in their judgment, the trouble developed from 
the occurrence at the Elks' Club. Mr. Harris, while in the 
hospital, was at times irrational for nearly a month, but the 
irrational periods occurred mostly at night, and during the 
daytime he received and conversed with visitors. 
As stated, there is no conflict whatsoever in the testimony 
in the case. 
ASSIGNMEN!fS OF ERROR. 
Your petitioner assigns as error the action of the Court 
in the following particulars, to-wit: 
I. In refusing to sustain petitioner's motion to strike out 
the evidence of the plaintiff. · 
II. The refusal to give each and all of the instructions of-
fered by the petitioner, and the giving of instructions for the 
plaintiff, over objections by the defendant. 
. ·m. In refusing to set aside the verdict, on the ground that 
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it was contrary to the law and evidence, and enter up judg-
ment for the defendant. 
ARGUME·NT. 
The defense against the claim was on the following points : 
A. That notice as required by the contract of insurance 
was not given. 
B. That there has been no accident, since the result follow-
ing the act of 1\fr. Peters of grasping the neck of the plaintiff 
was not unusual or unexpected, hut so far as the wound was 
concerned, the bruise was the natural and in fact almost in-
evitable result of the act, and so far as the cellulitis was con-
cerned, wag neither unusual nor out of the ordinary and was a 
result which often followed in such cases. 
C. That in any event, the real injury, that is the cellulitis, is 
admittedly a bacterial infection which caused or contributed 
to the injury, and was, therefore, specifically excepted under 
the policy. 
D. That though the injury was pyogenic, such infections 
are only covered under the tern1s of the policy where they 
occur '•with or through an accidental cut or wound", and in 
this case, the original wound, that is the bruise, was not ac-
cidental, as stated above. 
E. Even if there had been an accident, there was no total 
disability from the date of accident as required by the policy 
for recovery. 
It was admitted by the attorney for the plaintiff in the 
trial of the case that the infection was bacterial, and that 
such did cause or contribute to the injury, and, therefore, 
there could be no recovery, unless under the pyogenic infec-
tion clause. 
All the above points were covered under the motions to 
strike the evidence and to set aside the verdict as contrary 
to the law and the evidence, and, therefore, Assignments of 
Error I. and III. will be discussed together. 
I. and III. The action of the Court in refusing to strike the 
evidence, and in ref:using to set aside the verdict. 
In considering the above questions, it will be necessary to 
refer to certain general authorities as to rules of construc-
tion. In the case of Kennard v. Tra-velers Association, 157 Va. 
153, opi¢on by Holt, J., it is sta~ed: 
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''It i~ likewise universally conceded that courts cannot mako 
contracts for the people· and must construe them as written 
when they are plain upon their face, and this notwithstand-
ing the equally well-established rule that they are . to be, in 
doubtful cases, construed liberally in favor of the assured. 
Total disability does not have to be instantaneous, but to holcl 
that a reasonable time suffices is to 'vrite into the contracts 
something which the parties themselves did not put there.'' 
In the caase of Travelers Insurance Company v. Brinkley, 
decided March 12, 1936, S. E. Adv. Ops. April9, 1936, pp. 225, 
:226-7, the opinion of Judge Gregory states as follows: 
'' Contra~ts of insurance should receive a reasonable con-
struction so as to effectuate the purposes for which they are 
made. Legal effect should be given to the language used, and 
the object to be af!complished by the contract should be con-
sidered in interpreting it.'' 
In Hunter v. H ollin,qsworth, decided Jan nary 16, 1936, 183 
S. E. 508, Adv. Ops. March 5, 1936, the opinion of Gregory, 
J., quotes with approval from the opinion of Judge Prentis, 
153 Va. 416, 150 S. E. 257, 260, as follows : 
''This Court has gone as far as any_ court in enforcing in-
surance policies in favor of the assured in reserving all fair 
doubts in f~vor of the assured in such cases, but this rule can-
not be so extended as to disregard valid provisions of the 
contract." 
Bearing in mind the above principles, we discuss our rea-
~ons for our contention that both the motion to strike, and 
later the motion to set aside the verdict should have been 
sustained on the following ground, as set out above: 
A. Notice as required by the contract was not given. The 
facts in this connection are that the neck of the plaintiff Har-
ris was grasped on rFriday, March 29, 1935. Mr. Harris did 
his work Saturday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday 
and, until Friday afternoon. He consulted a doctor on Tues-
day, but continued to work until Friday afternoon1 when he 
caonsulted the doctor again, a.nd was sent to the hospital. The 
contract is made subject to all provisions and limitations 
contained in and endorsed thereon, and requires that written 
notice of injurv ori which claim is based must be g~ven within 
twenty days after the date of the accident causing the injury, 
but that failure to give notice within the time provided shall 
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not invalidate the claim, if it was not reasonably possible 
to then give such notice ''and that such notice was given as 
soon as was reasonably possible". The evidence shows that 
Mr. Harris entered the hospital on Friday, April 5th, in fact, 
just one week after the alleged accident, that he was oper-
ated on on April 9th, 12th and 17th, that while in the hos-
pital he was generally rational and received company, that, 
while irrational at times, this was generally at night ·and 
probably due to drugs administered. A short time after his 
operations he was sitting up and receiving company regu-
larly. He was allowed to leave the hospital (temporarily) on 
¥ay 8th, and go down town, returning to the hospital. On 
May 9th, he was allowed to leave again and went down and 
got his policy, and instead of then giving notice to the 
Company, he discussed the matter with his physician, Dr. Ad-
kerson, and wrote and delivered a letter to Dr. Adkerson, 
with the intention that Dr. Adkerson should notify the insur-
ance agent. As a matter of fact, Dr. Adkerson did not then 
notify the· insurance agent, but it was nearly two weeks later. 
The letter to Dr. Adkerson had been written in the office of 
Mr. Harris, where he had gone for the purpose of writing it. 
Dr. Adkerson held the letter until May 22nd, when Mr. Alex-
ander, the agent of the Insurance Company, happened to come 
into his office, and then delivered it to Mr. Alexander. 
The question is whether the claimant had given the notice 
''as soon as was reasonably possible". It appears from the 
above that certainly a short time after the operations were 
over, that is, April 17th, Mr. Harris was well enough to re-
ceive company and did receive company, and that thirteen 
davs before the notice was given the agent of the Company, 
he., had been well enough to go down town to get out his 
policy and from his office to write the letter to Dr. Adkerson, 
and deliver it personally to Dr. Adkerson. ' 
The evidence of both Dr. Adkerson and Dr. Devine dis-
closes that 'vhen. they were first consulted they both advised 
Mr. Harris that in their judgment his condition resulted from 
the occurrence at' the Elks' Club. Thus, he knew the situa-
tion and his rights under his policy within less than a week 
atfer the occurrence. We submit that it clearly appears that 
notice could have been given, probably shortly after April 
17th, in any event, on May 8th or 9th. If Mr. Harris saw 
fit to trust the matter to his physician, Dr. Adkerson, that 
was, of course, his responsibility, and any failure of Dr. Ad-
kerson, his agent, was the failure of Harris himself. He 
could certainly have given notice to the Company in writing, 
instead of writing to Dr. Adkerson. Thus, as a matter of law, 
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it would .seem that the notice 'vas not given as soon as was 
reasonably possible. 
I~ this connection, we refer to the following decisions : 
In the case of Sou,thern Horne Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 157 Va. 
686, 161 S. E. 914, the opinion was by Epes, J. The question 
~nv9lved the time for filing of proof of loss. It is well known, 
and doubtless will not be disputed that the law is stricter 
for the requirement of notice of clain1 than it is for filing 
of proof of loss. In that case the policy required the filing 
of proof of loss within sixty days after fire. The court, on 
page 696. of 157 Va., held that an instruction with reference 
to the filing of proof of loss was erroneous, and stated as 
follows: 
"Even if the policy is to be construed as providing that 
proof of loss must be filed within a reasonable time, where 
there is no conflict in the evidence, what is a reasonable time 
is a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for 
the jury ; and there was no conflict of evidence on this point.'' 
In Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 138 Va. 177, 121 S. E. 
507, the question was as to provision of policy requiring that 
the assured ''forthwith give notice". It was an automobile 
theft case. The Court held the word ''forthwith'' did not 
mean instantly, but must be a reasonable time under the cir-
cumstances, and that unless the lapse of time was so long as 
to be obviously a noncompliance with the contract, the ques-
tion would be for the jury, and held that a matter of four 
days could not be said to be as a matter of law an unreason-
able time. 
In H~tnter v. HolUn.qsworth, supra, decided January 16, 
1936, an automobile owner had an accident. There was no 
report to the Company until after judgment was gotten by a 
guest in the car. The policy provided for immediate notice. 
The Court held that the word must receive a reasonable 
construction and did· not n1ean instantaneous, but with rea-
sonable dispatch. It upheld the lower Court in holding as a 
matter of law that notice was not given with reasonablE.' 
promptness. The case is important in the discussion of other 
cases. It refers to Kennard v. Travelers Protective Assn., 
157 Va. 153, 160 S. E. 38, 39, as to which it used the following 
language: 
''On the night of August 6, 1929, Kennard struck his foot 
against a rocking chair. At that time this accident seemed to 
be too trivial for notice, but by Aug-ust 29th, twenty-three days 
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thereafter, his injured foot had become swollen and painful, 
and on September 6, 1929, he notified the Company. It was 
held that notice came too late and a recovery was denied.'' 
The Court also used the following language with reference 
to the provision for notice: · 
''There are excellent reasons for this provision, but, if the 
reasons were not good, the situation would not change. Here 
is a perfectly plain a:nd voluntary contract, and it is not the 
court's business to make muddy something clear ~ * *.'' 
The Court further stated as follows: 
''What is a reasonable time within fair limits? In the 
Cohen case we held that a delay from Saturday until :hfonday 
was reasonable. In the J(ennard case a delay from August 6th 
to September 6th was held to be unreasonable, and in 
Y ana go's Case, it was not· contended that a notice given two 
months after the accident was prompt notice.'' 
The Court also quotes from Sawyer v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
supra (D. C.), 10 F . .Supp. 848, 849, as follows: 
''Substantial compliance with a requirement for prompt no-
tice of accident is a condition precedent to recovery.'' 
The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court that 
notice was not given 'vith reasonable promptness. 
We call attention especially to the [( e1~nard case, supra, 
and its similarity to the case at bar, in that there was an 
injury (striking his foot against the rocker), which was not 
at first thought to be of any moment, and in which the no-
tice was given to the eompany within one week after the in-
jured foot had become badly swollen and painful, and it was 
held that the notice came too late, and recovery was denied. 
Here notice was not given for considerably over a month 
after the· claimant was advised by his physicians of the situa-
tion, and for approximately a month after he was able to sit 
up and· receive company, nor until two weeks after he was 
able to leave the hospital and go to his office. 
A very pertinent case is the case of Corley v. Atlantic Life 
Ins. Co. (S. C.), de~ided February 3, 1936, S. E. Adv. Ops. 
J\farch 12, 1936, p. 596, 183 S. E. . In that case, which 
was an accident policy case, the Court held that ignorance of 
the assured of what was meant by total and permanent 4is-
ability could not excuse his failure to give notice, that he must 
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comply with the provisions of the policy, and that failure to 
give notice as therein required was fatal to his claim. 
It is respectfully submitted, in view· of the above and nu-
merous other cases that might be cited, that the claimant failed 
as a matter of law to g·ive notice as soon as was reasonably 
possible, and recovery should have been denied on that 
ground, either by sustaining the motion to strike the evidence, 
or by setting aside the verdict; in fact, there being no con-
flict in the evidence, the whole matter was a matter for the 
decision of the Court, and certainly since it must be admit-
ted that notice was not givsn until two weeks after it could 
easily have been given. 
B. There was no accident, and thus no coverage under the 
policy providing for loss ''resulting directly and independ-
ently of all other causes from accidental bodily injuries". 
The claim of the notice of motion is for recovery on account 
of an alleged accident which ooourred on March 29, 1935, that 
is, when the neck of the assured was grasped by his friend, 
and for a period of total disability from that date. This 
Court has recently had occasion to consider at lengih the ques-
tion of what constihi.tes an accident, in the case of Ocean Ac-
cident & Guarantee Corporation v. Glover, decided Decem-
ber 1935, and reported in 182 S. E. 221. In that case the 
claimant holding· an accident policy had a pimple in his nose. 
He picked the pimple. Boil and blood poison developed, 
from which he died. Recovery was allowed. The medical tes-
timony was that the result was ·an unusual result and that the 
picking of the pimple does not usually cause such a result. In 
the inst~nt case, on the contrary, the testimony is that the 
g·rasping of the neck ·with the force which was evidently ap-
plied would naturally cause a wound or bruise, and that such 
would be the natural and probable result of the act. In that 
case the Court, on page 222, quotes from the leading caSt! 
of U. S. Mutual Assn. v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 33 L. Ed. 60,. 
as follows: 
'' * * • the term 'accidental' was used in the policy in its 
ordinaty, populai.· sense, as meaning 'happening by chance, 
unexpectedly taking place, nor according to the usual course 
of things, or not as expected'; that if a result is such as fol-
lows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not 
unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result ef-
fected by accidental means; "" • •. '' 
The above quotation is particularly pertinent, for here, su 
tar as the bruise is concerned, it was not unusual or unex-
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pected, but according to the medical testimony would in, ef-
fect, necessarily happen. Of course, Mr. Peters, in grasping 
the neck, did not anticipate or expect the dire results which 
followed, but the wound was the natural and expected result 
qf his act, according to the undisputed testimony, and, there-
fore, could not be classed as an accident. It was the usual 
and necessary result of such an act. This is particularly per-
tinent, in vi~w of the claim in the notice of motion that the ac-
cident was the bruise or wound on the neck. There is no claim 
in the notice of ·motion or bill of particulars of any ac-
cident other than the alleged accidental wound of the neck, and 
which, as shown, was the result of ''ordinary means volun-
tarily employed in a not unusual or unexpected way". Even 
if it should be claimed, as was true in the Glover case, above, 
that the accident was the sub~equent development, though 
such a claim could not properly be advanced under the plead-
ings in this case, the result would be the same, because here 
all the medical testimony is that from a wound of this·type the 
development of cellulitis is not an unusual occurrence; but 
very often happens, and so still it would not be an accident. 
We do not cite further authorities on this point, as the 
Glover case so fully discusses the question and contains a 
list of authorities. 
C and D. I:r.i any event, the real injury in this case, that 
is the cellulitis, is one- of the injuries specifically excepted un~ 
cler the terms of the policy, and is, therefore, not covered. 
It was admitted .at the trial by the attorney for the plain~ 
tiff, and in fact is necessarily true, that the provision of the 
policy excepting claims for ''accidental bodily injury caused 
or contributed to, directly or indirectly • • • by ptomaines 
or bacterial infections'' would bar any recovery under the 
policy, because of the fact that there can be no question in 
this case, but that the cellulitis, which was a bacterial infec-
tion, did, in fact, contribute directly or indir-ectly to the in-
jury. In fact, it was the sole cause of the re~l disability of 
the plaintiff .. Thus, the only question would be whether the 
case of the plaintiff is saved by the provision that the policy· 
does cover pyogenic_ infections which may occur through an 
accidental cut or wound. It is submitt~d that this pyogenic 
infection provision does not help the case of the plaintiff. 
It is admitted by all parties that the infection was pyogenic, 
or pus producing. . . 
This question, therefore, narrows down to the question 
above discu~s<?d, as to whether the pyogenic infection resulted 
from an accidental cut or wound. We have already discussed 
above the fact that the wound (bruise) in this case was not 
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accident, but was not only the expected, but, was in fact, the 
necessary result of the voluntary act of Mr. Peters. Though 
he rq.ight not have anticipated the dire results, it is a matter 
of common knowledge that if you grasp human flesh with con-
siderable force, you necessarily cause some bruising of the 
tissues, and this was the testim.ony of the doctors in the case. 
In short, leaving aside the question of the results, which 
would not be pertinent for the question now being discussed, 
the wound was not accidental, and, therefore, the pyogenic 
infection did not result from an accidental wound. 
. I 
E. Even if there had been an accident, and we submit the 
discussion under the last heading clearly shows there could 
be no recovery on this gTound, there was no total disability 
from the date of the accide~t as required by the policy for 
recovery. 
Bearing in mind always that the basis of the claim here was 
for the alleged accident on March 29th, we must consider the 
provision of the policy that it covers only for ''continuous to-
tal disability, and prevent the Insured from date of accident, 
from performing any and every duty pertaining to his occu-
pation". It is admitted that after the alleged accident on Fri-
day, March 29th, Mr. Harris continued the performance of 
his duties for one week, that is, until the afternoon of Friday, 
April 5th. True, he did testify that he was bothered from 
performing his work, 'vhich is that of an auditor for the City 
of Lynchburg, but there is no testimony that he failed to per-
form any of his duties during that period. It is noted that 
the notice of motion bases the claim on the accident which oc-
curred on ].\!farch 29th, and alleges continuous disability from 
that date (Rec., p. 4). In the bill of particulars, the total 
disability is claimed, not from the date of the alleged acci-
dent (lVIarch 29th), but from April 5th, while the policy re-
quires that the total disability must be continuous from the 
date of the accident: 
The case of Kervnard v. Tra·velers Protective Association. 
157 Va. 153, 160 S. E. 38, involved a similar question, the 
·opinion being written by 1\fr. Justice Holt. In that case Judge 
Holt, after holding that policies of insurance must be con-
strued according to their ordinary sense and meaning, if they 
are clear and unambiguous, and the terms are to be t.aken in 
their plain, ordinary and popular sense, deals With the facts 
of the case. In that case, the policy provided for coverago 
where the accident ''·shall, independently of all other causes 
immediately, continuously and 'vholly disable him'·'. The 
Oourt held that the word "immediately" did not necessarily 
mean instantaneously. but ''is not, on the other hand, eq"':liva-
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lent to the phrase 'within a reasonable time', hut requires that 
.the disability shall result presently and without any substan-
tial interval". See opinion, 157 Va. at page 159, quoting 
from 1 C. J. 468. 
The facts were that Kennard was injured by striking his 
foot against a chair on August 6, 1929. At the time the acci-
dent seemed too trivial to be noticed, but by August 29th his 
foot had become badly swollen and painful and a physician 
was called, and on September 6th, he gave the Company no-· 
tice of his claim. The opinion discusses at lengih numerous 
cases on the subject of what constituted immediate and con-
tinuous disability and the process of nature doctrine held 
by some courts, to the effect that if a delayed result follows 
within such time as the process of nature consumed in bring-
ing about the total incapacity, that such a result is considered 
as immediate, and disapproves of this doctrine, on the theory 
that the Court cannot write contracts and could only construe 
them as written, when they are plain on their face, and held, 
as a matter of law, that twenty-three days was too long a time 
to consider the disability as immediate and continuous from 
the date of the accident, and denied recovery. It is noted 
in this case that the Court cites with approval the following 
cases: 
Willia·ms v. Prefen·ed Mutual Accident Association, 91 Ga. 
698, 17 S. E. 982, in which recovery was denied to Williams, 
who was struck on the head, but continued to give more or 
less attention to his business for several days, "when he was 
forced to take to his bed'', and in which case it was further 
noted that the provision of the policy ''necessarily implies 
that the injury must be such that the insured cannot- pro-
c.eed regularly and in due course with his occupation;· that 
he cannot go on with his work or business as if he had re'" 
ceived no injury, and then, upon becoming· 'vorse, cease the 
transaction of his business or labor, and· hold the company 
responsible for the loss of time". 
Mullins v. IJiasonic Protective .Ass'n, 181 Mo. App. 394, 
168 S. W. 843. l\tlullins was hurt on October 6th, and worked 
some days, but trouble developed and on October 16th he was 
forced to go to a hospital for treatment. The Court held that 
while immediately did not mean instantaneously, yet it could 
not be stretched to mean several days, and so denied recovery. 
Sou.thern Surety 'Co. v. Penzel, 164 Ark. 365, 261 S. W. 920. 
In this case the plaintiff cut his finger on January 6th and 
blood poison set in on January 9th, just three days after-
ward. It was held that the provisions of the policy were too 
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plain to be misunderstood, and that the plaintiff was not 
wholly and continuously disabled from the date of tl1e accident. 
McDaniel v. Business JYien's .Assur. Co. of America (Mo. 
App.), 6 S. W. (2d) 337. The plaintiff struck his foot on No-
vember 21st. Pain developed on November 23rd, and on the 
26th, just five days after the accident he was taken suddenly 
ill. Recovery was denied on the ground that there had been 
no total and continuous disability from the date of the ac-
cident. · 
Letherer v. U. 8. Health db Accident Ins. Co., 145 Mich. 310, 
108 N. W. 491. The plaintiff was hurt on October 2nd, but 
.continued to work until the '9th (just one week, as in the case 
a.t bar). No recovery was permitted on the ground that the 
plaintiff had not been wholly and continuously disabled. 
As stated, the Court cites a number of cases in which the 
"process of nature doctrine" has been allowed to control but 
disapproves of these cases. We have referred here only to 
the cases most pertinent to the case at bar, and which were 
cited in the opinion in the Kennard case. 
. It is respectfully submitted that, under the facts of this 
case, the plaintiff having done all of his work for a week, and 
not even having gone to a doctor until four days after the al-
leged accident, there has been no such total and continuous 
disability from the date of the accident, as required by the 
tenns of the policy, and recovery should have been denied 
on that ground. 
II. INSTRUCTIONS. 
It was, and is our contention that, there being no dispute 
as to the facts of the case, all the matters were matters of 
law which should have been decided by the Court on the mo-
tion to strike or on the motion to set aside. The questions 
in regard to instructions involve practically the identical ques-
tions discussed above, and it would be only necessary to deal 
briefly with the instructions, referring back to the arguments 
above presented. 
The defendant excepted to the giving of instructions Nunl-
bers 1, 2, and 4 for the plaintiff, and the refusal to give in-
structions A-1 and I as offered for the defendant. · 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 1. (Rec., p. 57.) 
This instruction is n finding instruction, and instructed the 
jury that if they believed that, while the policy was in force, 
ITarris suffered accidental bodily injury, and that as a sole, 
eli rect result thereof in connection with pus forming- infec-
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tions "which occurred with and through an accidental bruise 
or wound'', the plaintiff was totally disabled, etc., the jury 
should find for the plaintiff. 
The objection to this instruction (R-ec., p. 53) was that it 
was based on an accidental bruise or wound, when there had 
been no accidental bodily injury, the bruise- or wound being 
the natural and usual result of the act which caused it. 
We have already argued above the question of whether the 
bruise or wound was an accident, and we refer to that argu-
ment to show the error of this instruction. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2. (Rec., p. 57~) 
This instruction undertakes to define the meaning of the 
word .''accidental'', and that if the jury believe that Peters, 
"in. a playful or jesting spirit unintentionally bruised plain-
tiff's neck, which caused an unseen, unexpected or unusual 
result'' then the injury has resulted through accidental means. 
Objection to this instruction (Rec., p. 54) was first that it 
is not the actual intention of the person, but whether the re-
sult is a natural result, and that the instruction thus improp-
erly states the law with reference to what constitutes an acci-
dent. 
This matter has likewise been discussed and governed very 
largely by the case of Ocean Accident <I; Guarantee Corpora-
tion v. Glover, supra. We submit that a reading of that case 
will show that it is not the question of the intention of the 
person causing the wound or bruise, that is, whether he actu-
ally intended to wound or bruise, or not, but the question is 
determin~d hv whether the wound or bruise is the natural and 
probable consequence of the act; and the evidence in this case 
~hows that it was the natural and probable, and in fact, the 
n«:'cessary result of the act. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 (Rec., p. 58). 
This instruction No. 4 dealt ·with the question of notice, and 
instructed the jury that if they believed that Harris, within 
twenty days from his injury, was so ill as to necessitate hos-
pitalization and surgical operation, and that the plaintiff was 
from time to time delirious, so that it was not t·easonably 
possible to give notice within twenty days, and that the plain-
tiff g·ave such notice through his physician as soon thereafter 
as 'vas reasonably possible, then the notic.e was sufficient and 
the delay constituted no defense. This instruction was ob-
jected to on the ground that it appears as a matter of law 
that the notice was not given as soon as reasonably possible. 
This point has been discussed above in connection with the 
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question of notice. It was further objected to on the ground 
that the evidence discloses that Mr. Harris, when he con-
~ulted physicians, 'vas advised that they attributed the results 
to the alleged a~cidcnt, and he could have given notice even 
before he went to the hospital. (Rec., pp. 54-55.) 
Certainly, it would seem unquestionable that, instead ol 
writing to his doctor when he was out of the hospital and went 
.to his office and got his policy, he could have written to tho 
C_ompany, or its agent. Certainly, also, the defendant is not to 
be charged with the delay of Dr. Adkerson in holding the let-
ter for .thirt<?en days before he delivered it to the agent of the 
Company. Under any circumstances notice could clearly have 
been given to the Company thirteen days before it was given. 
We do not see how it could possibly be said that it was given 
''as soon as reasonably possible". 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTIONS REFUSED. 
The Court refused to give Instruction A-1 (found Rec., p. 
62). Frankly, we are unable to understand the reasons of the 
Court for refusing this instruction. It simply instructed the 
jury that the oblig·ation onliarris to give notice was personal 
to him, and that when he arranged with Dr. Adkerson, his 
physician, to notify the Company, he writing the letter to 
Dr. Adkerson, the failure of Dr. Adkerson would be the fail-
ure of the plaintiff, and that if the notice did not reach the 
Company as soon as was reasonably possible for the plain-
tiff to have given it, then it was insufficient, and the verdict 
must be for the defendant. The action of the Court was ob-
jected to on the ground that the instruction correctly stated 
the law, and that the obligation on the plaintiff to g·ive notice 
in person or through an agent is the same (Rec., p. 55). The 
Court gave no reason for refusing this instruction, and we 
can see no reason for such refusal. The jury might easily 
coJJ.ceive that when Harris wrote his own physician and in-
structed him to notify the Company, that such notice ~oulcl 
be notice to the Company. The instruction simply set out the 
doctrine of agency, and that a man was responsible for the 
acts and failure of his agent, and that the Insurance Company 
.could not be held responsible for failure of the agent of Har-
ris. 
INSTRUCTION I. (Rec., p. 63.) 
This instruction ,vas refused and the action of the Court 
was excepted to (Rec., p. 56) on the 11:round that it properly 
sets out the law in terms of the policy, and from the evi-
dence. · 
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The instruction simply instructed the jury in the language 
of the poliey that there eould be no recovery unless the al-
leged injuries had caused continuous, total disability, and 
prevented the insured from the date of the alleged accident 
from performing any and every duty of his occupation, and 
then referred to the evidence to the effect that if they be-
lieved that the alleged injury occurred on March 28th or 
29th, and that Harris continued to work as a deputy audi-
tor to April 5th, then they should find for the defendant. This 
question has also been discussed above, which discussion may 
be considered as repeated here. We submit that the instruc-
tion is correct as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION. 
In view, of the above, it is respectfully submitted that the 
judgment of the Circuit Court for the City of Lynchburg iB 
clearly wrong, for the failure of the Court to strike the evi-
dence and to sustain the motion to set aside the verdict and 
enter judgment for the defendant, and that the Court was 
also erroneous in the giving and refusing of instructions, as 
noted above, and that the case should be reviewed and re-
versed by this Court, and that final judgment should be en-
tered for the defendant, for reasons st.ated, and petitioner 
prays accordingly. 
In the event the petition for writ of error is granted, this 
petition will be used as the opening brief for petitioner, and 
petitioner states that it desi1·es to present orally its reasons 
for granting the prayer of the petition. 
A copy of this petition was delivered to A. D. Barksdale, 
attorney for the claimant, Ray S. Harris, on the 21st day of 
April, 1936. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CASKIE & FROST, 
Attorneys for petitioner. 
f 
We, James R. Caskie and E. :NI. Frost, attorneys practic-· 
ing in the Supreme Court of the State of Virginia, do certify 
that in our opinion the judgment complained of in the fore-
going petition should be Teviewed and reversed by the Su-
preme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia. 
Respectfully, . 
JAS. R. OASKIE, 
E. J\f. FROST. 
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The undersigned attorney for·Ray S. Harris, acknowledges 
receipt of a copy of the foregoing petition, this 21st day of 
.A. pril, 1935. 
Received April 22nd, 1936. 
A. D. BARKSDALE, 
Attorney for Ray S. Harris. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
June 9, 1936. Writ of error and supersedeas awarded by 
the Court. Bond $1,200. 
M. B. W. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Don P. Halsey, Judge of 
the circuit court of the city of Lynchburg, at the court 
house thereof, on the 24th day of Feb 'y, 1936, and in the 
160th year of the Commonwealth. 
Be it remembered, that heretofore, to-wit, on the 22nd day 
January, 1936, Ray S. Harris by Mess. Barksdale & Ab-
bot, his attorneys, caused to be served and returned to the 
clerk's office of the circuit court of the city of Lynchburg, his 
notice of motion for judgment for money against Glens Falls 
Indemnity Company (a corporation) of Glens Falls, New 
York, returnable to the first day of the Feb 'y term, 1936, of 
said court. 
At which day, to-wit, at Lynchburg circuit court, Feb'y 11th, 
1936. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and on mo-· 
tion of the plaintiff it is ordered that this motion be dock-
eted. On motion of the defendant, it is ordered that the plain-
tiff do file on or before the 15th day of February, 1936, a 
bill of the particulars of his claim, and on the further mo-
tion of said plaintiff, it is ordered that the defendant do file 
on or before the 19th day of February, 1936, a statement of 
the grounds of its defense. 
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The plaintiff's notice of motion for judgment for money is 
in the words and figures following, to-w.it: 
To Glens Falls Indemnity Company (a corporation) of Glens 
Falls, New York: 
page 2 ~ Take Notice, that on the 1st day of the Febru-
ary Term 1936 of the Circuit Court of the City of 
Lynchburg, Virginia, I, the undersigned Ray S. Harris, will 
make a motion in said Court at its Court House in said City 
at 10 o'clock A. M., or as soon thereafter as I may be heard, 
for a judgment against you for Nine Hundred and Thirty-one 
Dollars and Forty-one Cents ($931.41), with interest thereon 
from July 8, 1935, until paid, the same being due by you to 
me by contract, for this, to-wit: 
That on, to-wit, May 23, 1930, you executed and delivered 
to me an income accident insurance policy, No. ''IAC2022", 
bearing date of May 23, 1930, as aforesaid, in consideration 
of my 'payment to you of the sum of Twelve 'Dollars ( $12.00) 
as premium therefor, and by successive renewals and pay-
ments by me to you the said policy of insurance was 
continued in force up to and including, to-wit, all of the year 
1935. 
The original policy, upon which this action is brought, is 
filed herewith pursuant to the provisions of Section 6094, Code 
of Virginia 1919, as amended, and the undersigned avers 
that he has performed all the conditions of said policy and 
violated none of its prohibitions. 
By the terms of the said policy you thereby insured me 
for a weekly .accident indemnity of Forty Dollars ($40.00) 
per week against loss, as therein defined, resulting directly, 
and independently of all other causes, from accidental bodily 
injuries. · . . 
· That by the terms of said policy you further contracted 
~: . 
page 3 } ''Of, 'if such injury' shall not result in any of the 
losses mentioned in Schedule 1, but shall cause con-
tinuous total disability, and prevent the Insured from date 
of accident frQm performing any and every duty pertaining 
tQ his occupation, the Company will pay him the weekly ac-
cident indemnity above specified for the period of such dis-
ability,'' and you further contracted that: 
''If 'such injury' to the Insured shall entitle him to weekly 
indemnity under the terms of this policy, and within ninety 
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days . from the commencement of disability shall necessitate 
treatment and residence in a licensed hospital, the Com-
pany will pay, in addition to the indemnity otherwise pro-
vided for a period not exceeding fifteen consecutive weeks, 
during which time the Insured shall be necessarily confined in 
the hol:)pital, the amount expended by him for hospital expense 
bu~ not exceeding per week the amount payable hereunder as 
a si~gle weekly indemnity.,., · 
-
That thereafter, on, to-wit, March 28, 1935, in the Elks~ 
Club, in Lynchburg, Virginia, one McHenry Peters came up 
behind the undersigned, who was watching a card game, and 
playfully caught him around the back of his neck. The un-
dersigned tried to free himself and accidentally sustained in-
juries to the back of his neck consisting of bruises and con-
tusions. Said bruises and contusions resulted in carbuncles 
on the back of the neck of the undersigned, and also cellulitis, 
which caused the undersigned to be gravely and severely ill, 
and necessitated, to-wit, three surgical operations. Said in-
juries and illness resulted directly and independently of all 
other causes from accidental bodily injuries as aforesaid 
· Such injuries did not result in any of the losse& 
page 4 }- mentioned in Schedule 1 of said policy2 but such in..: 
· .juries did cause continuous total disability and pre-
vent the insured, from and after the date of the accident to 
July 8, 1935, from performing any and every duty pertain-
ing to his occupation, by reason of which you became obli-
gated, on, to-wit, July 8, 1935, by the terms of said policy, to 
promptly pay to the undersigned the sum of Forty ·Dollars 
($40.00) per week for said period, aggregating the sum of, 
to-wit, 1Five Hundred and Thirty-one Dollars and Forty-one 
Cents ( $531.41). 
Such injuries to the undersigned did entitle him to weekly 
benefits under the terms of said policy, and within ninety 
days from the commencement of disability did necessitate 
treatment and residence in a licensed hospital, to-wit, ~{emo­
rial Hospital, Inc., of Lynchburg, Virginia, for a long· period 
of time, to-wit, from· April 5, 1935, to June 14, 1935. ·Where-
npon, and by reason thereof, you, by the terms of said policy, 
became obligated to pay to the undersigned, in addition to 
the indemnity otherwise provided for, the sum of Forty Dol-
lars ($40.00) per week for said period while the undersigned 
was necessarily confined in said hospital, the amount expended 
by him for hospital expense having exceeded the sum of 
},orty Dollars ($40.00) per week, such sun1 having· aggre .. 
gated the sum of, to-wit, Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00). 
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-
for hospital expenses, aggregates, to-wit, Four Hundre(!. Dol-
lars ($400.00), and covers a period of, to-wit, ten weeks. 
Therefore, by reason of the premises as aforesaid, on, 
to-wit, July 8, 1935, I, the undersigned, became en-
page 5 } titled to, and you became obligated to pay to mez.....the 
said sum of Five Hundred and Thirty-one lJol-
lars and Forty-one Cents ($531.41) and Four Hundred Dol-
lars ($400.00), aggregating the sum of Nine Hundred and 
Thirty-one Dollars and Forty-one Cents ($931.41). Although, 
on, to-wit, July 8, 1935, I requested that you pay to me the 
said sum of Nine Hundred and Thirty-one Dollars and Forty-
one Cents ($931.41), and thereafter often repeated the said 
request, nevertheless, you have altogether failed and refused 
to pay the said sum of Nine Hundred and Thirty-one Dol-
lars and Forty-one Cents ($931.41), or any part thereof, and 
continue so to fail and refuse payment thereof. Wherefore, 
I will move the s::tid court for judgment against you for the 
said sum of Nine Hundred and Thirty-one Dollars and Forty-
one Cents ($931.41), with interest thereon as aforesaid. 
RAYS. HARRIS, 
· By Counsel. 
·BAR.J{SDALE & ABBOT, p. q. 
BILL OF PARTICULARS. 
The plaintiff, as and for his bill of particulars in this ac-
tion, says: 
(1) That, as set out in his notice of motion, plaintiff avers 
that he has performed all the conditions of said policy and 
violated none of its prohibiti.on~; · 
(2) That on, to-wit, J\iay 9, 1935, the plaintiff, being a pa-
tient in the ~Iemorial Hospital, Lynchburg, Virginia, gave 
a written statement of his injuries and the circumstances 
thereof to his attending physician, Dr. W. C. Adkerson, and 
requested him to give this notice to the· agent of the 
page 6 r defendant; that promptly thereafter, on, to-wit, May 
· 10, 1935, said Dr. W. C. Adkerson, for and on be-
half of the plaintiff, gave said notice to G. M. Alexander 
in Lynchburg, Virginia, the authorized agent of the defend-
ant at Lynchburg, Virginia; that thereafter, to-wit, June ~3, 
1935, one .JP. E. Topping, Claims l\ianager of defendant, ac-
knowledged in writing receipt of said notice; that the notice 
given by plaintiff as aforesaid constituted a substantial com-
pliance with the terms of the said policy of inst,rance·, for 
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the reason that it was not reasonably possible for plain-
tiff. to give such notice earlier by reason· of his extreme illness 
and confinement in said hospital, and such notice was given 
as soon as it was reasonably possib~e; 
(3) That formal proof of loss upon the forms supplied 
by the defendant was mailed to defendant on, to-wit, No-
vember 13, 1.935, and received by defendant on, to-wit, No-
vember 18, 1935; 
(4) That the items of plaintiff's claim are as follows: 
Total disability April 5, 1935, to July 8, 1935, at 
the rate of $40.00 per week, $531.41 
Hospital treatment at Memorial Hospital, Lynch-
burg, Virginia, ten weeks at $40.00 per week, $400.00 
Total ~31.41 
(5) That the itemized statement of plaintiff's hospital 
bill at said hospital is as follows: 
To board and nursing., April 5 to June 14 
To operating· room and dressings 
To anaesthetic (3) 
To examination of specimens 
To miscellaneous 












BARKSDALE & ABBOT, p. q. 
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE. 
The defendant, for grounds of defense to the claim set up in 
this cause, says: · 
1. The defendant denies that the plaintiff had given proper 
notice, as required under the terms of the policy, to entitle 
him to recover. 
2. That the injuries complained of were a result of bacte-
rial infection, which contributed both directly and indirectly to 
the injuries complained of, and were therefore specifically ex-
cepted under the coverage of the policy sued on. 
3. The policy in question covers only for accidental bodily 
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~n~ur~es. The injuries in question were not accidental bodily 
InJuries. 
4. The injuries in question are not included under any of 
the terms of the policy sued on. 
5. The defendant will rely upon any defense proper un-
der the plea of general issue. . 
GLENS FALLS INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
By Counsel. 
CASKIE & FROST, p. d. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXCEPTIONS: 
page 8 ~ G. M. ALEXANDER, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Barksdale : 
Q. Mr. Alexander, you are manager or owner of Ivey & 
Kirkpatrick, Insurance Agency of Lynchburg, are you not t 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that the local agency for the Glens Falls Indemnity 
Companyf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did your agency issue this policy to the plaintiff, Mr. 
Ray Harris 7 · 
A. Yes, sir" we did. 
Q. Was it paid up and in force during the month of March, 
last year, 1935? 
A. It was. 
Q. I~ this receipt correct renewing the policy for a period 
of six months ·from November 23rd, 1934 f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you receive notice from any one of the accidental 
injury to Mr. Harris~ 
A. Yes, sir, from Dr. Adkerson. 
Q. Do you remember when that was f 
A. It was after May 20th. I won't be sure, but my guess 
would be it was about the 21st or 22nd. 
Q. What action did you take t . 
A. I at once. notified Mr. Bristow. My impression is that 
I was in Dr. Adkerson 's office one afternoon late and he told 
me Mr. Harris wanted to make a claim on his accidental policy. 
It was the following morning, as I recall, that I 
page 9 ~· gave the information to Mr. Bristow. 
Q. Mr.· Bristow is your claim adjuster? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Caskie: 
Q. ·You· stated that you were in Dr. Adkerson's office about 
another matter and he mentioned this matter to you there. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. He gave you a letter then, didn't heY 
.A.~ I don't recall much about the letter. I think he must 
have. They. say they remember seeing· it in the office and l 
checked up with ~ir. Bristow and he· said there was a letter. 
I do remember Dr. Adkerson telling me ~ir. Harris wanted 
to make a claim under his accidental policy and whether the 
letter was received then or sent in later I am not sure. 
Q. You stated that was in the afternoon Y 
A.· That ·is my recollection. 
Q. And the next morning you gave notice to ~Ir. Bristow 
for investigation Y 
A. 1Ces, sir. . 
Q. You are sure it was after May 20th though you don't 
know the exact date! 
A. Yes, sir. 
The witness stands aside. 
page 10 r RAY S. HARRIS, . 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
. DIRECT EXAMINATION. ' 
By Mr. Barksdale: 
·Q. You are Ray S. Harris, the ·plaintiff in this suit Y 
.A. Yes, sir, I am. 
Q. What do you do, Mr. HarrisY . 
A. I am Deputy City Auditor for the City of Lynchburg. 
Q. You do office work, do you? 
A. I do. 
Q. You are the 1\fr. Harris who was insured by this policy 
:which Mr.· Alexander just referred to? 
A. Yes, sir. · · · · 
Q. Was this policy in force during the month of March, 
19357 ... 
···A. It was, ·and later on they refused to renew it . 
. Q. It .was originally taken out when Y 
A. It states on here' the 23rd . day of May, 1930. 
Q. Had you renewed· it and kept it in force from that time 
on7 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Mr .. Harris, did you receive any bodily injury during 
last year? 
A. I did. 
Q. When? 
· .A. March the 29th, I am quite positive. It may have been 
the 28th but I am positive it was on the 29th. 
Q. That was what day of the week? 
A. Friday. 
page 11 ~ Q. Where were you? 
A. In the Elks Club in Lynchburg. · 
Q. I wish you would just tell the Court and jury exactly 
how this accident happened, what time of day it was and. all 
about it. 
A. It was some little bit after five o'clock. I usually quit 
\vork at fi-ve o'clock and stroll up to the Elks Club. I walked 
in there and several fellows were playing a game of cards 
and I walked up close to one of them. They are small rooms 
there, about ·eight by nine and to get in the room you had to 
get.up close to the fellow and I was standing right at the en-
trance and some one came in and grabbed me by the neck. I 
kne'v who it was, l\1:cHenry Peters. He is always doing a lot 
of horse-play and I tried to free myself by throwing myself 
for\vard but I couldn't get away from him because a man was 
standing directly in front of me. I didn't break his hold and 
I told him he was hurting me and not to cut my head off, so 
he released me. 
Q. Let me interrupt you there. You knew Mr. McHenry 
Peters, did you not f 
A. Very well indeed. 
Q. Is he or not a friend of yours' 
A. He is a friend. 
Q. How long had you known him? 
A·. Since he has been· in Lynchburg, about eighteen years. 
Q. Did Mr. Peters catch hold of you maliciously or have 
anything against you 1 
page 12 ~ A. Oh, no, we were friends. 
Q. I see. Well now, after the play or scuffle was 
over ·did you suffer any discomfort? 
A. I did for a few minutes. 1\!Iy neck pained me very much 
for a few minutes and after that I felt no pain. 
A. You said that was late on a Friday afternoon, the 29th 
day of March? 
A. 29th of March. 
Q. Did you feel any soreness or pain the next day? 
A.- Well, I wasn't feeling very well and went to the Elks 
Club. to get my lunch. 
Q. :First, did you go to work? I ~ 
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A. I went to work, yes, sir. I wasn't feeling very well and 
I told Dr. Foster if he didn't object I would drive· down to 
his place in the country and spend the afternoon. I wanted 
to get out and get a little sunshine. I wasn't feeling well. 
Q. Did you go down there Y 
A. I did. 
Q·. Did you have any discomfort down there? 
A. I did. 
Q. How did your neck feel the next dayY 
A. On Saturday Y 
Q. Yes, sir, Saturday. 
· A. I felt a stiffness in the neck. 
Q. Did you feel any discomfort Sunday? 
A. Very much. 
Q. Were you in town that day? 
page 13 )- A. I was. 
Q. Well, now, on Monday,-you say you do office 
work as assistant auditor,-did you go to work on MondayY 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you feel any discomfortt 
A. I certainly did. 
Q. Did it bother you any in your work? 
A. It did. ~ly neclr was stiff and there were knots in my 
neck. It was very stiff. 
Q. When did you first feel knots in your neck T 
A. Sunday morninsr. · 
Q. Now, when you went to work Monday did you feel up to 
your usual good feeling or were you suffering discomfort 
from it7 
A. No, sir, I certainly did not feel well. I was suffering 
discomfort. 
Q. Did you consult any physician T 
A. I don't think I did until Tuesday. · I am not positive 
but I did on Tuesday. · 
Q. Whom did you consult f 
· A. Dr. Clyde Adkerson. 
Q. What did he prescribe or do Y 
A. He told me to go home when I quit work and put a 
poultice on my neck and keep it on there until I left to come 
to work th£: next morning and to keep it hot every two or 
three hours. 
0. Did you keep it on there? 
.L~. I did. 
Q. Did he tell you to lie downY 
page 14} A. I don't know whether he told me to lie down 
but that is about the only way you could keep one 
on your neck. 
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Q. That was Monday, the first, or Tuesday, the sooond. 
Now, on up until the 5th how did your nook feel! Did it 
get better or worse 7 
A. It continued to get worse. 
Q. Did you continue .. to go to your offiee 7 
.A. I did. 
Q. Up until when 7 
A. Up until Friday afte.rnoon. I went there Friday after-
noon. 
Q. That was the 5th. Where did you go on the 5th Y 
A. Shortly after I went in the office pains were in my 
shoulders so severe that I couldn't sit down and I couldn't 
be still. I went to see Dr. Adkerson and he said ''Go to the 
hospital immediately". 
Q. Did you see Dr. Devine . also T 
A. Not until later in the evening. Dr. Devine came to see. 
me after I got to the ~ospital. 
Q. On the 5th 7 
A. Y~s, sir. 
Q. Mr. Harris, during all that period up until the time you 
went to the hospital were you suffering pain from your neck 
or notY 
A. Quite a little pain but not so awfully severe until Friday. -
My neck was very_ stiff. 
Q. Was it sufficient pain to bother you and interfere with 
your ability to work Y 
page 15 } A .. It certainly was. I couldn't hardly twist my 
head around. 
Q. You did go ahead and undertook to do your work un-
til Friday? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you fe~l as if you wanted to do any work? 
By Mr. Frost: We object to that question. 
By Mr. Barksdale: I will withdraw it. 
Q. Now, on the 5~h you say you went to the hospital. Then 
how long did you stay "in the hospital? 
A.. Stayed in the hospital from April 5th to June 14th. 
Q. I will ask ·you if that is a bill you received from the 
Memorial Hospital. 
A. Yes, sir, that is the bill. 
Q. In the total sum of $594.00? 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. Of which $94.00 is for special .nursing! 
A. That is part of the special nursing. I had qttite a bill 
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other than _that for special nursing, but that much of that bill 
is for· that too. 
Q. The hospital bill proper is $500.00 Y 
A. That is correct. 
Q. ·You were in there from April 5th to June 14th which is 
how many weeks Y 
A. Ten weeks to the day. 
. Q. So your actual hospital expenses in there 
page 16 ~ were $500.00 for ten weeks, or how much a week 1 
A. I don't get you on that. 
Q. You were in there ten w·eeks and your total bill was 
$500.00. How much was that a week? 
A. $50.00 a week. 
By Mr. Caskie: I think 've might accelerate matters. We 
are not raising any question as to the amount he is entitled 
to, nine hundred and some dollars alleg·ed in your notice of 
motion, i:f he is entitled to anything·. · 
By Mr. Barksdale: I won't go into that any further then. 
Q. What was your condition, )\,fr. Harris, after you got to 
the hospital Y 
A. I was suffering very much and my neck was very pain-
ful. I was feeling terribly bad. 
Q. How did you progress? What happened to you while 
you were there Y 
A. They commenced to poultice my neck and were sup-
posed to put a fresh poultice on it every hour. 
(Mr. Barksdale addressing 1\{r. Caskie) Do you admit 
the Memorial Hospital is a regular licensed hospital? 
By :M;r. Caskie : Oh yes. 
Mr. Barksd:-1le (continues) : 
Q. You say they applied poultices. What else did they 
doY 
· · .A. They g·ave me a lot of stuff to keep me in bed 
page 17 ~ and to keep me quiet so 1 could get a little sleep. 
I don't lmow what it was. 
Q. Was· any operation performed 1 . 
.... ~. On Tuesday afternoon, which was the 9th day of April. 
Q. Who operated Y 
A. Dr. Devine, with the assistance of Dr. Adkerson. 
Q. Did they perform any further operation? . 
A. On the 12th, which .was Friday. They did the same oper-
ation over again. Dr~ Devine and Dr. Adkerson were .the 
doctors. 
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Q. What was· the condition of your neck at that time 1 Did 
you have just one sore place Y . 
A. No, sir, it was from here to here (indicating each side 
of the back of his neck) and up and down my neck. It cov-
ered quite a big space back there. 
Q. Did you have any further operation f 
A. I did. I think it was on the 17th. The record will bear 
that out. I am not positive but I think it was the 17th. 
Q. Did you suffer any pain Y 
A. Quite a lot of pain .. 
Q. Were you conscious at all times 7 
.A.. No, sir. 
Q. Did they have to give you any sedative! 
A. They shot hypodermics in me sometimes three or four 
a night and they couldn't hardly keep me in bed or 
page 18 ~ keep me quiet. 
Q. When were you first allowed to leave the hos-
pital to eome down town? 
A. About four weeks after I entered there the doctor told 
nie if I could get out tn the sun he thought it would help 
· me a little bit and I think the record will bear it out that maybe 
it was the 9th I wrote the letter. I dropped into the office and 
found my policy and I asked the girl if she could write a few 
lines; that I had talked to Dr. Adkerson about the policy and 
I wanted to notify the company. Dr. Adkerson had said he 
would be kind enough to notify the agent. 
Q. When did you get your policy out and look at it? 
A. The date of the letter. 
Q. The letter is dated the 9th of May. 
A. That is the date then. 
Q. Where is your office 1 
A. In the First ·National Bank Building. 
Q. When was the first day you were permitted to leave the 
hospital Y 
A. I think the day before that. 
Q. I will ask you to look at that and see if that is a copy 
of the letter you wrote to Dr. -Adkerson. 
A: I don't know. It is the same wording. I don't know 
whether it is a copy of the original letter or not but it is 
the same letter. · 
Q. Let me ask you this: For what purpose did you give 
· that to Dr. AdkersonY 
page 19 ~ A. I asked Dr. Adkerson what to do about it. I 
told him I l1ad· !in accident policy with the Glens 
Falls Ihdemnity Company, or with ~fr. Alexander, and I asked 
him did he know what procedure to follow and he said he 
would talk to Murrell Alexander about it· and he asked m,~ 
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to write him the facts about the case leading up to the time 
I fh~st called on him. Shall I read the letter Y 
Q. Yes. 
A. 'J~his letter is dated, ''Lynchburg, Virginia, May 9th, 
1935. Dr. C. W. Adkerson-Dear Doctor: On March 28th 
or 29th, while in the Elks Club watching a Rummy game Mr. 
McHenry Peters in a playful mood walked up and grabbed 
me by the neck from behind. I tried to break his hold but 
could not do it, so asked him not to cut off my head,-not to 
cut my head off. So on Saturday evening, March 30th, my 
neck appeared to be stiff and on Sunday morning, March 31st, 
n1y neck was very stiff and I felt knots deep in my neck. This 
continued to get worse and I called at your office on April 1st 
or 2nd and from this time on you are familiar with the case. 
Yours very truly, R. S. Harris." 
Q. Did you or not ask Dr. Adkerson to give this company 
any medical information f 
A. I thought sure he would give it. He was going to take it 
up with Murrell Alexander and do whatever was necessary. 
· Q. I will ask you if thereafter any agent of 
page 20 ~ the company came to see you in the hospital. 
A. About two weeks later Mr. Bristow came to 
see me at the hospital. 
Q. Did he ask for. any informationY 
.A. He asked me to fill out a questionnaire. 
Q. Did you do soY 
A. Yes, sir, I sat up on the bed and stratched it out and 
filled out this thing. 
Q. You say he came to see you while you were still in the 
hospital about two or three weeks after this happened Y 
A. Probably two weeks. 
Q. Now, you 'vere discharged as a patient from the hos-
pital on the 14th of June. Were you able to go to work thenf 
A. I was not. 
Q. When did you go to work Y 
A. July 8th. 
Q. Did you give anyone any notification of that fact Y 
A. I called Mr. Bristow on the telephone and told him I 
'vanted to report to him that I was back at work and he ad-
viRed me he would see me the next morning. 
Q. Had you or not apprized Mr. Bristow of the fact that 
you would claim for your disability under your policy? 
A. Yes, sir, I told him while he was in the hospital to see 
me. He talked to me about that then. 
page 21 ~ Q. You called him on the day you went back to 
work. For what purpose did you notify him you 
'vere back at work! 
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A. Well, to notify him under the terms of the policy that 
the liability had ceased; that I was back working. 
Q. And· that was on July SthY 
A. That was on July 8th I called Mr. Bristow. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Caskie: 
Q. Mr. Harris, you state you don't know whether it was 
the 28th or 29th you were injured but that it .was on a 
:Friday. . 
A. I am quite positive it was on a Friday and I felt so bad 
the next morning,-! am quite sure it was Friday, the 29th. 
Q. It appears from the calendar that March 29th would 
have been Friday. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, as I understand, when Mr. Peters grabbed you back 
of the neck he grabbed you with considerable force and you 
couldn't pull away; that it hurt you so yon could not pull 
aloose. · 
A. I tried to release myself and I was in a tight place 
and couldn't get away from him. I told him he was hurting 
rpe and not to cut my head off. 
Q. He must have grabbed you with considerable force. 
A. He is a very strong man. You let him try 
page 22 ~ it on you sometimes. 
Q. I don't think I will let him try on me. He 
grasped you with considerable force Y 
· A. Yes, sir, and when I tried to release myself he had a 
powerful grip on me .. 
Q. He applied considerable force then. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You told him not to cut your head off. Did it hurtY 
A. Yes, sir, it hurt. It certainly did. . 
Q. I believe you said you suffered pain for a few minutes 
after that and then it wore off for the time being. 
A. I didn't think anything more about it for a few days. 
Q. It was the next day that you noticed the stiffness in 
the neck! 
A-. You are correct. 
Q. And Sunday the knot developed t 
A. Yes, sir, and my neck was very stiff. · 
Q. When you went down with Dr. Foster down in the coun-
try it was on a farm, wasn't it f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you do down there t 
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· A. I went down to get some sunshine. That is the real rea-. 
s'on I ·went down there. . 
Q. I mean what did you do down there. 
A. Dr. Foster asked me to sow some lespedeza seed over 
the ground down there, knowing I was a farmer. 
page· 23 r The gro.und was hard and I didn't do that. So a 
darkey was·rolling a lawn, an old darkey, and he 
had a heavy roller. He was about fagged out with it and I 
got hold of the . roller and I rolled a place about as much 
spa~e as half of this room, I suppose, and that is when I felt 
the stiffness in my neck for the first time. 
Q .. While rolling the roller? 
A . .After I got through I felt the stiffness in my neck. 
Q. I understand you were operated on three times and the 
last time I believe was on April 17th. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Those operations· were lancing~ 
A. I don't know whether 'lancing or not. You ask the doc-
tor. He can explain that better than I can. I don't think 
there was any lancing. I think he just plowed through n1y 
neck. 
Q. That is the way it felt anyhow¥ 
A. You can ask the doctor what he did. 
Q. It was all on the back of your neck? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You say the first time you were allowed out was on 
May 8th? . 
A. I think that is right. I am not positive about that. 
Q. It was on the 9th you came down and got your p~Iicy 
and wrote the letter T 
page 24 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You had been sitting up in the hospital some-
time prior to that, hadn't you Y 
.A.. I walked out in the hallway two or three days befor{} 
ilid . 
Q. I think the records will show you were sitting up on 
April 24th. 
A. Possibly so. 
Q. Did you receive any company at that time¥ 
· A. I received company all the time. . · 
Q. Except for the times you were delirious you were able 
to see company Y • . . 
. A. I think I saw company-when I was delirious, because so 
many people came in and talked to me that I don't remember 
anything about. 
Q. How long were you delirious Y 
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A. The whole time I was in the hospital at night, and even 
after I left I had delirious spells. 
Q. During the daytime? 
A. At nights. 
Q. How long were you there when you couldn't remember 
when people were there Y 
A. You know I had an. accident and was in the hospital 
until this letter was written on the 9th and then I had some 
poison in my system and that is when I had to take blood 
transfusions and I lay in the bed for three weeks 
page 25 ~ without g·etting out of my room. 
Q. Were you delirious during all of that time Y 
A. Not all the thpe. I didn't think I was so delirious in the 
daytime but people who came. in there say I was talking to 
them and I didn't remember it. I thought I had plenty of 
sense. 
Q. You were delirious at times 1 
A. ·Yes, sir. , 
Q. At other times you w.era perfectly all right and remem·· 
bered things, is that ·correct? 
A. Yes, -sir. 
Q. You went in the hospital on April 5th. Were you con-
sdous most of the time thereafter? 
A. I would say most of the time I was conscious, yes, sir. 
Q. You just had these delirious spells Y 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. And when you were conscious people came to see you 
and you could talk to them? 
, A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You delivered this letter, you say, to Dr. Adkerson on 
the 9th of 1\Iay. You relied upon Dr. Adkerson to take the 
matter up with the insurance company for you Y 
A. I explained to Dr .. Adke-rson I had the policy and he 
thought it covered my· illness and I didn't know what proce-
dure.to take and he said he 'vould see Mr. Murrell .... 1\.lexander 
and for .~e- to .write him a letter stating the facts 
page 26 ~ up to the time he first. saw me .. 
Q. Dr. Adke;rson was to take it up with the in-
surance company for you 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You don't know when he did take it up with them? 
A. I do not. 
Q. Co"uld you r.ecall, Mr. Harris, the date· you gave notice 
to the Continental Insurance Company for· sick benefits 7 
By Mr. Barksdale: I don't know what on earth that is 
but I see no releYancy between- · .. 
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By Mr. Caskie (interposing): What I want to find out is 
whether he gave the notice as soon as he reasonably could. 
By Mr. Barksdale: I withdraw my objection. 
By the Witness: Mr. Dave Edwards heard of my sick-
ness and came to see me. He told me I had a policy with his 
company. I had a sick or disability policy and the first ninety 
days were ·waived, but with the proviso, however, that in case 
that I was in the hospital I was to receive so much compensa-
tion per month. I don't know what the date was. 
Q. You don't remember the date? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. ·You gave notice to him prior to the notice to 
page 27 ~ this company? . 
A. No, sir, quite a while afterwards. 
By Mr. Barksdale: 
Q. Is Mr. Edwards, Mr. Dave Edwards, agent of the com-
pany who wrote that Continental policy? 
A .. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do I understand he came over and advised you that 
you had it and made your report for you T 
A. He asked me to get my policy out so he could see it. 
Bv ~Ir. Caskie: 
· Q. That was a sick benefit policy of some kind? 
A·. Yes, sir. 
Bv Mr. Barksdale : J 
· Q. I forgot to ask you this: Did any other doctor examine 
you during your illness? 
A. I suppose about ten doctors saw me during my illness. 
I don't know whether they examined me or not. 
Q. Did Dr. Rawlings examine you? 
A. He did. 
Q. Approximately when was it Y 
A. .A day or· two before I left the hospital. 
Q. At whose instance and request Y 
A. He advised me that he wanted to make an examination 
and made an engagement to see· me the ~ext day. He said 
he was. representing the insurance company. 
Q. Did he examine you? 
page 28 ~ A. Yes, sir. 
Q. While you were in the hospital be oxamined 
you at the request of the insurance company? 
A. Yes, sir. 
The wi tn<: ss stands aside. 
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· JULIUS DAVIS, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows~ 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Barksdale: 
Q. Mr. Davis, are you a member of the Elks Club in Lynch-
burg? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you or not see any scuffle or horse-play between Mr. 
McHenry Peters and Mr. Harris Y · 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. Last year 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you. remember the exact date 7 
A. No, I don't. I think it was sometime last spring. In fact 
it was about a week or so prior to Mr. Harris going to the 
hospital. 
Q. You knew both Peters and Harris well? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Both 'belong to the Elks Club as you do 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you or not know that Mr. Harris was 
page 29 } in the hospital last springY 
A. I did not know until I heard about it prob-
ably ten days after it happened. 
Q. About how long before you heard he was in the hos-
pital was it that you saw this horse-play in the club? 
A. I would say about a week or two before. I don't recol-
lect exactly. 
Q. Will you tell the Court and jury just what you did 7 
A. I happened to be in that sam~ room where some of the 
boys were having a card game. I happened to be in there 
just watching it just like Mr. Harris and McHenry Peters 
.came in afterwards. I noticed just as he came in he got 
a hold of Mr. Harris' -neck. It looked like he just sort of 
gripped it right hard and I noticed Mr. Harris trying to get 
away from him but being as the boys were playing at the 
table and the room was small he couldn"t shake himaelf 
aloose right away and finally I heard Harris state, "Turn me 
aloose. You are trying to cut my head off''. After he turned 
his neck aloose I happened to go over and I noticed that his 
neck was very red and showed some of the fingerprints on 
his neck. 
Q. Mr. Davis, you said you knew both of these people quite 
well. Was this anything like a .fight or was there any ill 
'vill about it7 
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A. No, not at all, just in a playful mood. 
Q. Either one mad· or ·show any temper before or after-
. wards? -
page 30 }- A. No, sir. 
No Cross Examination. 
The witness stands aside. 
. DR. JOHN W. D_EVINE, . 
· ·- -haVing been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXA.:MINA.TION. 
By Mr. Barksdale: 
Q. You are Dr. John W. Devine, a practicing physician and 
surgeon in the City of Lynchburg, are you notf 
A. Yes, sir. 
By Mr. Caskie: We admit his qualifications .. 
By Mr. Barksdale: 
. Q. Dr. Devine, . did Mr. Ray Harris, the plaintiff in this 
suit, come to· you, or were you called in professionally in his 
case? 
A. I was called in by Dr. Adkerson to see Mr. Harris on 
April 5th. He was in· the Memorial Hospital. 
Q. You saw him. in the Memorial Hospital Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I wish you would, without taking up time asking you 
questions, .just go ahead and detail what condition you found 
him in, what history he gave you, what your diagnosis was, 
and what you did for him Y 
A. He gave a history of having had a contusion on the 
back of his neck at the Elks -Club a few days prior 
page 31 r to this and when I saw him he had an enormous 
contusion of the back of his neck and what appar-
ently was- a carbuncle or cellulitis. 
Q. Is it ordin~rily or customarily to be expecteq that a 
slight bruise- will result in a cellulitis or carbuncle Y 
A. It will if it becomes infected by some pyogenic infec: 
&a -
Q. Ordinarily and customarily do bruises result in this 
sort of a thing Y 
A. Well, I wouldn't say ordinarily they did. 
Q. It may but,- ·_ 
A. Very often they do if they· become infected. 
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Q. Now, I believe you just said you could see what looked 
like fingerprints. 
A. Well, he had a place on one side of his neck that was 
rather small compared to the opposite and from what he said 
you could almost visualize a hand grasping the back of the 
neck from these bruises he had. Then in a short time the 
whole neck became involved and the area in between these 
two came into one, the whole back of his neck sloughed off. 
Q. Was an operation performed by you Y 
A·. Yes, sir. We took him in the operating room and gave 
him gas and with a cautery, an electric cautery, a red-hot 
iron, we striped and crossed it to give drainage and removed 
some of the slough out of there. His condition was right se-
rious for quite a while and we gave him numerous infusions 
of glucose and saline and gave him at least two or 
page 32 ~ tl1rec blood transfusion3. 
Q. Did you have to give him any sedative? 
A. Oh, yes, he _suffered considerable pain and we had to 
give him something every night. 
Q. Was he conscious all the time Y 
A .. He was irrational at night, the nurse said, st times, 
and I don't know that he was irrational much during the day. 
Of course some of that may have been due to the sedative 
he was taking and the infection together, but for a right good 
while we were considerably uneasy about him. We feared 
that he would have a blood-stream infection. He ran a high 
temperature, and then we gave him blood transfusions. I 
don't have the records here but on the 17th, I think, 've took 
him back in the operating room and repeated this operation, 
and then I am quite sure we took him back again. I don't 
have a record on here of the third time we took him in, but I 
am pretty sure that we did. . 
Q. Mr. Harris testified that from the best of his recollec-
tion the first time he was permitted to leave the hospital was 
about May 8th or 9th. vVhat do your records show about 
that, if anything? 
A. The record shows he was djscharged on 6/14. 
Q. That is June 14th. You don't show when he was per- · 
mitted temporarily to ride down town and back, do you 1 
A. No, sir, that is not on here. 
page 33 ~ Q. Doctor, this policy has got a provision in here 
· saying it does not cover accidental bodily injuries 
caused or contributed directly, or indirectly, by sickness or 
disease, or by ptomaine poison or bacterial infections. What 
is bacterial infection¥ Does that cover all sorts of germs? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Now it goes on and says, ''Except pyogenic infections''. 
What is pyogenic infection? 
A. That is a pus producing infection. 
· Q. That is everything the 'vords mean Y 
.A.. Pus forming. 
Q. It covers any sort of germ that forms pus? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ''Which shall occur with and through an accidental 
cut or wound."· Now, what does the word "wound" meanY 
A. It may be an open cut or a contusion. 
Q. Is it confined to an open sore? 
~ A. It may be an open cut or may be a contusion. It doesn't 
have to be an open wound. It can be open or closed. 
Q. Will you please tell the Court and jury what, in your 
opinion, caused the illness or injury to Mr. Harris' neck which 
you have described f 
A. Judging from the history of the case my opinion is 
that the contusion of his neck from this bruise he got caused 
a breaking down of the tissue, or really a killing 
page 34 ~ of the tissue from this contusion, and then infec-
tion through the hair follicles in the back of his 
neck caused this pyogenic germs or pus-forming germs to 
get in and produce this condition which he had, which was 
a carbuncle or cellulitis, which is rather hard to differentiate 
between the two. 
Q. You have mentioned pyogenic or pus-forming infec-
tion, which was present in this case. I will ask you whether 
or not in your opinion that pyogenic infection occurred with 
and through and in connection with ·this wound or bruise on 
his neck. , 
A. I think it did, unquestionably. 
Q. Are there or not, Doctor, germs superficially present 
in the skin of everybody Y 
A. Yes, sir, there are germs on all of our ~kins at all times. 
As long as the tissues are normal we are able to throw those 
germs off and they do not cause infection. · 
Q. Are they pyogenic germs present T 
A. Yes, sir, and other pus-producing germs also, but if 
the vitality of the tissues is lowered for any reason at all 
these germs will take hold and begin to form pus and break 
down the tissues. 
. Q. They get into the devitalized pssue through the hair 
follicles Y 
A. That is one of the most common ways unless the skin 
· happens to be broken. They could get in through 
page 35 ~ that. · 
Q. In this particular instance of Mr. HarrisY 
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A. In this particular instance I would think they probably 
came through the hair follicles following this injury. 
Q. Now,. Doctor, I asked you whether or not in your opinion 
this injury which you have described resulted directly and 
independently of. all other causes from the accidental in-
jury which was described· to you in the history. 
A. He had no other condition for it to have come from. 
Q. Did you make any tests or examinations to see if it 
could come from anything else Y . 
A. The only other thing that carbuncles come from, as a 
rule, would be diabetes. They often accompany diabetes be-
cause in a diabetic person. the tissues are all below par and 
the least little thing will cause infection. He had no sugar. 
He had no diabetes, and the other examinations were nega-
tive. He had no other condition. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Caskie: . 
Q. Dr. Devine, did I understand you to say when you speak 
ordinarily of contusions that it means bruises f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you say he had these contusions on the back of 
the neck you mean he had bruises which were caused, from 
the history he gave, by grasping of the neck Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Was that badly bruised? 
page 36 ~ A. Yes, sir, I would say it was . 
. Q. That would indicate, would it not, that he had 
been grasped with very considerable force on the back of the 
neckY · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Dootor, if anybody grasped the back of the neck with 
considerable force would that naturally cause some .bruise of 
the tissueY 
A. Yes, sir. 
,Q. That is the natural and probable result? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q When Mr. Barksdale asked you I believe you said in a 
bruise of this kind it doesn't always happen but that it very 
often happens that infection gets in and sets up where there 
is a bruise of· this sort; that it is not unusual, is itf 
A. No, sir. ·. 
Q.- As a matter of fact we know people do have infections 
and boils and carbuncles and we don't know what they come 
from except the germs hav.e gotten in there some way and 
gotten a hold. 
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A. That is true. 
Q. In this particular case you attribute it to this bruise 
because there was ~bruise there¥ 
A. ·I attributed it to that on account of the history of the 
case which would indicate that was what it was. 
page 37 ~ Q. When did you come to that conclusion, Doc-
torY 
. A. When I first saw him. 
- Q. Did you advise Dr. Adkerson of that? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q·. When did you advise :rvrr. Harris of itY 
A. I think I did at that time. 
Q. Do you recall when you think you told him you thought 
this thing came from the bruise on the neck Y 
A. I couldn't tell you very definitely but when he gave me 
the history of having had this wound he probably asked me 
at- that time if I thought this caused it. 
Q. And you told him T 
A. I did. I don't just recall that definitely, but I am quite 
sure that he knew that was my opinion. 
Q. You are quite sure that he knew that was your opinion 
right shortly after you were called in the case? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That had been your opinion all along? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q·. It would be the natural thing for you when getting the 
history to discuss it and say 'vhat you thought it resulted 
from, wouldn't itt 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. As I understand you now, the natural result of this 
grasping was to bruise, in your opinion, the cells or tissues 
of the neck. Is that rightY 
· A.. What is that? 
Q. The natural result of his grasping ~{r. 
page 38 ~ Harris' neck with the force apparently used was 
to bruise the tissueY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. A very common result from such a bruise is that in-
fection does set in after that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It is not unusual, do you think? 
A.~ No, it is not unusual. 
Q·. Now, Doctor, carbuncles and cellulitis you state are 
very hard to differentiate. Both are bacterial infections, are 
they not! 
A. Yes, sir.. · · 
Q. Pyogenic infection is also bacterial infection Y 
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A. Pus producing. . 
Q. That is. one where pus is produced but bacteria is what 
produces the pus, isn't it Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I believe you state in this case that a wound may be 
either an open wound or a bruise. 
A. Open or closed. 
Q. If I walk up to you and hit you hard enough to produce 
a bruise that is a woundY 
A. Yes, sir. 
The witness stands aside. 
page 39 } DR. W. C. ADKERSON, 
having been :first duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Barksdale: 
Q. Dr. Adkerson, were you consulted professionally during 
the past year by Mr. Harris, the plaintiff here? 
.· A. Yes, sir. I 'think he was in my office Aprillst or 2nd. 
Q. I wish you would state to the Court and jury what his 
condition was, the symptoms and history, and just what was 
do:ne and how he· progressed. 
A. He came to my office for examination of his neck. He 
had an inflammatory mass back of his neck and gave me a 
history of having received contusion several days previously 
by Mr. ~1:l3Henry P'eters when he in a playful manner caught 
hold of the back of' his neck and caused him some pain and 
discomfort. He came to my office probably' once ·or twice 
afterwards and I appreciated the severeness and illness of 
the case and I advised him to go to the hospital immediately 
and he took my advice and went to the hospital. 
r Q. From the time you saw him first, which you say you 
think was April 1st, which appears to be a 1\{onday, you 
treated him until the 5th, when you advised. ]:lospitalization. 
What was the progress of the· thing Y . 
A. Very rapid. It progressed very rapidly arid I advised 
him to use local applications: lie came to my office several 
times and during that' time the progress was very 
page 40 ~ rapid. 
· · · Q. From your observation of the case, and the 
history and so forth, what, in your opinion, caused the in-
jury which you have described Y . 
· A. From the hist'ory.of the case and from my observations 
I think this contusion he received caused it. 
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Q. Was that or not in connection with pyogenic infectiou T 
A. Yes, sir. . 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Caskie: 
Q. Dr. Adkerson, you say you attribute this to the wound 
or bruise on his neckY 
A. From the history which I received I do. 
Q. A wound, as I understand it, may be either a bruise or 
· cut. Is that correct f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Doctor, the contusion of the neck which you saw there 
had been inflicted several days prior to that. Were there· 
any indications that he had been grasped with considerable 
forceY 
A. From my examination of the inflammatory mass I 
would say he did receive a pretty severe contusion. 
Q. In other words, it was a pretty severe grasp ·on his 
neck! 
A. Possibly so. 
Q·. Doctor, is it natural that a grasp of that sort would 
produce a bruise of the tissues Y 
A. It may or may not. 
Q. I mean is it natural that a grasp of that mu~h 
page 41 ~ force would bruise the tissue f 
A. From my opinion of the case that is what 
caused it. 
Q. That much force was what caused it. Then this con-
dition would be the natural result of that grasp Y 
A. It could be. 
Q. Now, the infection that set in, that is a bacterial infec-
tion, I understand. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you agree with Dr. Devine to the effect that with a 
bruise of this sort it is not unusual that infection should set 
inY 
A. I agree with Dr. Devine. 
Q. Does it often happen Y 
A. Right often. 
Q. Does it happen very often Y 
A. Right frequently it does happen. 
Q. Do you recall, Dr. Adkerson, when Mr. Harris was al-
lowed to sit up Y 
A. I couldn't state the exact date, no, sir. It was several 
weeks after he was in the hospital. He left, got worse and 
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went back and remained for some time. I can't state the exact 
dates. · 
Q. I think the hospital records will show it was ce~tainly 
on April 24th pe was sitting up. 
A. I will accept the hospital records. . 
Q. If he wenf there on April 5th that would be 
page 42 } nearly three weeks, wouldn't itT -
A. Yes, sir. 
Q·. Was he allowed to receive company during all that time? 
A. Yes, sir, he received some company but his company 
was supposed to be limited. 
Q. He stated he was irrational at times but that w~s usually 
at nights. 
A. Most times in the evening due to elevation of the tem-
perature. 
Q. Was he generally rational during the day time Y 
A. Most of the time. 
· Q. When did you reach your conclusion, Dr. Adkerson, that 
this condition of the neck was due to this grasp of the neck 
by Mr. Peters Y 
A. When I received the history of the case, I think prob-
ably the second time he was in my office. 
Q. Did you discuss that with Mr. Harris? 
A. He told me about it and I considered that as the cause. 
I didn't discuss it with him but he told me that is what hap-
pened. 
Q. Did you tell him you thought it came from thatY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you tell him that at the time you came to that con-
clusion? 
A. I think I agreed with him that that was what produced 
it. -
page 43} Q. Anyway, it was very soon after you first saw 
him that he was advised that it came from this 
grasp he received. 
A. I think the second time he was in my office he gave me 
the history and I told him probably that was what caused it. 
By the Court: 
Q. Was there actual formation of pus in this wound? 
A. Yes, sir, a great deal~ 
Q. Did you drain that? . 
A. Yes, sir, it was cauterized. Dr. Devine and myself took· 
him to the operating room, gave him gas, and made a great 
many lacerations. We just opened it up so it could drain 
thoroughly. 
The witness stan~s aside. 
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By Mr .. Barksdale : The plaintiff rests. 
By Mr. Frost: We will excuse Dr. Rawlings. 
By Mr. Barksdale: If you don't put Dr. Rawlings on I 
am going to call him as a witness. 
By Mr. Frost: We object to the plaintiff, after closing his 
cas~, to introduce further evidenc·e on examination of direct 
facts. ,· 
page 44} 
By the Court: It is unusual but I will permit it. 
By Mr. Frost : We except to the ruling of the 
Court on the grounds stated. 
DR. J. HENRY RAWLINGS, 
having been first duly sworn, testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXA~1INATION. 
By Mr. Barksdale: 
Q. Doctor, did you examine Mr. Harris while he was ·in 
the hospital T · 
.A. I did. 
· Q. ·About when did you examine him? 
.A. The date of the report will tell you the date of the ex-
amination. It was shortly before he left the hospital. I do 
not know the exact date but it is on my report. · 
. Q. I haven't got your report. For whom did you examine 
hhnf . 
A. For the insurance company and .it was shortly before 
he left the hospital. I do not know the exact date but I can 
look at my books and find out. , 
Q. I will ask you, Doctor, what, in your opinion, was· the 
cause of the injury. 
· A. From the history of the case I would have thought that 
the traumatism incurred in the grasping of his neck by ~{r. 
Peters was the cause of the injury. 
· Q. Doctor, does every bruise result in a cellulitis or car-
buncle! · 
·A. It does not. . 
. Q·. It is or not unusual for cellulitis to result 
page 45 ~ from .an ordinary bruise? 
A. ·That depends on several factors. It depends 
upon the amount of traumatism exerted; it depends upon the 
. c·onstituency of the tissues, the amount of injury that is .ex-
perienced by them, and it also depends upon the vital resist-
~nc_e of the patient to infection. · 
~~~rl: . 
Q. You used two words that we ·woul~ like to have you 
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enlighten us as to what they mean. What do you mean by 
''traumatism ''f 
A. External violence. 
Q~ What do you mean by cellulitis Y 
·A. That is a diffused generalized inflammation of the skin 
and subterraneous tissues,-of the skin and the tissues un-
derneath the skin. And, I will go a little further. A car-
buncle is a circumscribed inflammation of the tissues. It is 
more circumscribed. The other is more spread out,-and 
both are due to pyogenic infection or pus forming germs, 
usually the staphlycoccus, and streptococcus. 
Q. Was it really a carbuncle or a cellulitis f 
A. I didn't see it until it was all over. It showed a granu-
lated wound where he had been operated on but all of that 
was past. I am merely giving expert opinion from the his-
tory ~f the ca~e and g~ne!al condition in such cases. When 
I saw him he was almost ready to leave the hospital. He had 
these large wounds on the back of the neck which 
page ~ ~ :were he~di~1g or _granulated. You could see where 
he had been operated on but the cellulitis or car-
buncle had disappe~red, of course, and I had nothing to base 
an opinion on as to what it was at that time. 
The witness stands aside. 
,; I 
By Mr. Barksdale: The plaintiff rests again. 
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE. 
E. M. BRISTOW, . 
having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXA~IINATION. 
By Mr. Caskie: 
Q. Mr. Bristow, .were you the Mr. Bristow to whom :h{r. 
Alexander said he referred this matter for investigation? 
A. I am. 
Q. He stated that he received a letter sometime after the 
20th of May or along about the 21st or 22nd and the next 
morning after l1e received it he gave it to you. Do you know 
what time the notice was given to you? 
A. On the morning of May 23rd. 
Q. You know that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you make a record at the timef 
A. I did. 
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Q. Mr. Bristow," when you :first saw Mr .. Har~is:witll:·J·ef.er:: 
ence to this matter did the company admit or deny 
page 47 ~ any liability? 
By Mr. Barksdale: Now, if your Honor please, I don't 
know the purpose of that. I understood that it was agreed 
that the proofs of loss were properly :filed and I see no ma-
teriality in that. 
By Mr. Frost: We will withdraw the question. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr .. Barksdale: 
Q. Mr. Bristow, you went over and saw Mr. Harris while 
he was still in the hospital, did yon not Y 
A. I did. . 
Q. Yon are claim adjuster locally for this defendant com-
pany, are you not Y 
A. I am. 
Q. And yon had him examined while he was in the hos-
pital by Dr. Rawlings or a doctor of your own choosing? 
A. I requested Dr. Rawlings to examine Mr. Harris be-
fore he left the hospital. 
By Mr. Caskie : 
Q. Do you recall the date you first saw Mr. Harris Y 
A. On the afternoon of May 27th. 
Q. Was there any discussion as to whether the company 
would deny liability or not at that timeY 
A. No, sir. We did not go into the question of whether 
the company was liable. I simply went to him to get the 
facts from him regarding what happened so we 
page 48 } could check up on it further. 
Q. In other words, a report came in and you 
went to get the facts? · _ 
A. That is all. No question of settlement was entered into 
there. 
Q. I am not asking you about that. Did you ever see Mr. 
Harris and deny liability to him? 
A. I did later. 
Q. Did you call on him to do anything prior to your deny-
ing- liability on the case except to give you these facts you 
asked for? 
A. I might have suggested to him to let me have some of 
his bills as to expenses. 
Q. That was part.of" the investigation, but I mean did yon 
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ever caU. on him to do anything at all before denying liability 
except the necessary matters to make your report Y 
A. Not ·as I recall except the investigating of it. 
· Q. · You did deny liability to him Y 
A._ Liability was denied. 
By. Mr. Barksdale: 
Q. When did you deny liability? 
A. I just don't recall the exact date, but in the latter part 
of the summer. 
· Q~ In writing Y 
A. In person. 
Q. Well, now, just when, the best you can · re-
page 49 t member Y 
By the Court: What is the materiality of all thisY 
By Mr. Barksdale: I objected to them asking him about 
this but they brought it out anyhow. They opened up the 
subject and I think I have a right to go into it. 
By the Court: I can't see any materiality to it, but go 
ahead. 
Mr. ~arksdale (continues) : 
Q. Mr. Bristow, isn't it a fact that your company never ab-
solutely denied liability until I received a letter the 21st of 
November after proofs of loss had been filed Y You needn't · 
answer that. I am inclined to agree with his Honor in that 
it is not material. 
The witness stands aside. 
F. E. TOPPING, 
having been first duly sworn, testified as follows: 
DffiECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Caskie: 
Q. You are district manager for Glens Falls Indemnity 
Company? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. With your office in Richmond Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The evidence shows this matter was presented by Mr. 
Alexander to Mr. Bristow on May 22nd or May 23rd. Was 
the matter then referred . to you after that notice 
page 50 t came in? · · 
· · A. The matter was referred to me, I think, on 
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the first day of J nne, the early part of J nne. · I don't· have 
the specific dates here. 
Q. Had you gotten a report from Mr. Bristow? 
A. No, sir. That 'vas the first information I had when I 
got the report from Mr. Bristow .the early part of June. 
Q. I)id you write Mr. Harris a letter on June 13th with 
reference to this matter T · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is that a c·opy of it Y 
A. Yes, sir, that is a copy of it. 
Q. I would like for you to introduce this letter as ''Exhibit · 
A'' and have you read it to the jury. . 
. A. This letter is addressed to Mr. Harris, dated the 13th 
of June, 1935, giving the policy number and so forth and is 
as follows: 
"Dear Sir: We have recently been furnished with a no-
tice of an alleged accident which was supposed to have oc-
curred on March 28th or 29th, 1935, at which time you con-
tend that you received a neck injury. As you doubtless know 
under your accident policy with the Glens Falls Indemnity 
Company it is necessary for you to report any accident to the 
Company within twenty days from the date of the accident. 
You did not report this accident within the required time so 
any investigation which we have made or might make in this 
case will be made, of course, with all reservations of rights to 
the Glens Falls Indemnity Company. We will proceed to 
investigate and handle this matter under the terms of your 
policy but please understand that we are not waiving any of 
our rights by making such investigations. Very truly yours, 
page 51~ 
GLENS FALLS INDEMNITY COMPANY 
By, F. E. TOPPING, 
Claims Manager. 
CROSS EXA1\1INATION. 
By Mr. Barksdale : 
Q·. You always write them that, don't you T . 
A. No, sir, not until I see some occasion for it. 
Q. Do you. admit liability before you· investigate·· a case? 
A. No. 
··Q. You had not completely investigated this one, had you T 
A. We had not completed our investigation. · 
Q. You did get all the information you wanted w:hich was 
in the possession of Mr. Harris from him Y 
A. Mr. Bristow talked •to Mr. Harris. The first time I 
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talked to Mr. Harris was along in the summer when Murrell 
Alexander and I went to see him. He suggested that I come 
up and discuss the matter with him. I had written Mr. 
Alexander and Mr. Bristow too that we were not going to 
pay the claim. I don't know as I made a special trip for 
the purpose but at Mr. Alexander's request I went to see 
1\IIr. Harris. 
Q. Mr. Bristow got a full report from Mr. Harris as to 
how this accident happened and all about it when he was in 
the hospital, didn't he t 
· A. He got a report. I don't know how full it was. 
Q. He got a written report and forwarded it to you 7 
A. He sent me a report, yes, sir. 
By Mr. Oaskie: 
Q. Was it after you received that report that you sent this 
letter? 
page 52 ~ A. I wrote the letter while we were trying to 
get the information. 
The witness stands aside. 
End of all testimony. 
Note: At this point the jury retired from the court room. 
By Mr. Oaskie: We want to make a motion to strike the 
plaintiff's evidence on the following grounds: 
1. That the evidence does not show that the plaintiff was 
continuously disabled from performing his usual occupation 
from the date of the accident; .' 
2. That the notice was not given within the time provided 
for· by the policy in that it was not given as soon· as was 
reasonably possible for the plaintiff to give it, as is dis-
closed by the evidence and required by the policy; 
3. That the plaintiff's injuries in this case are injuries 
which were followed or contributed ·to directly, or indirectly, 
by bacterial infections which are specifically excepted from 
the policy and it does not come within the exception to the 
exception dealing with pyogenic infection because the injury 
or wound was riot an accidental injury or wound, but was one 
that was deliberately inflicted through the deliberate act of 
the third party ; · · 
4. That this is an accident policy covering, only 
page 53 ~ accidental bodily injuries and the evidence discloses 
that the injuries were not the result of an acci-
dent but the result of a deliberat~ act of a third party; 
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5. That the injuries complained of were not those included 
under any of the terms of the policy sued on. 
Note: The foregoing motion to strike the plaintiff's evi-
dence having been fully argued by counsel, the court made 
the following remarks: 
By the Court : I think the case is one properly to go to the 
jury under proper instructions. I therefore overrule the 
motion. 
By Mr. Ca:skie : We note an exception to the action of the 
court for the reasons stated. in our grounds of the said mo-
tion. 
OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS. 
By Mr. Caskie: We object to Instruction No. 1, on the 
ground that there is no evidence to show there has been any 
accidental bodily injury; that the injury was not an accident 
at all; that the injury was the natural and usual ·result of a 
deliberate act. 
By the Court: I give that instruction. 
By Mr. Caskie: We except for the reasons 
page 54 } stated. 
. . Defendant, by counsel, objects to No. 2, because 
that goes back to the argument that we have already made; 
that it is not the intention of the person but whether the re-
sult is a natural result. 
By the Court: I am going to give No. 2. 
By Mr. Caskie: We except to the giving of Instruction 
No. 2, because it improperly states the law with reference 
to what constitutes an accident. 
Now, the defendant objects to No. 3. That is a positive 
instruction saying he gave notice in time. We object to that 
under the evidence because the evidence shows he did not 
give notice as soon as 'vas reasonably possible. 
By the Court: I reject No. 3. 
By Mr. Barksdale: We except to the action of the court 
in refusing Instruction No. 3, on the ground that no forfeit-
ure for failure to comply with this requirement is in the 
policy and there being no conflict of evidence it appears that 
reasonable notice was given as a matter of law and I now 
offer this instruction No. 4. 
By Mr. Caskie: We object to No.4, upon the ground stated 
for No. 3, and in addition that the evidence discloses that 
the doctors advised Mr. Harris immediately after 
page 55 } this thing happened that they attributed this re-
sult to this accident and he could have given no-
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tice then, even before he went to the hospital. That was on 
the 2nd or 3rd of April. 
By the Court : I will give No. 4. 
By Mr. Caskie: ·We note an exception for the reasons 
stated. 
By the Court: We will now consider the defendant's in-
structiqns. I will g-ive "A'' but will have to refuse "A -1 ". 
By Mr. Caskie : We except to the action of the Court in 
refusing instruction ''A -1'' on the ground that it correctly 
states the law and the obligation on the plaintiff to ·give 
notice in person or through an agent is the same. 
By Mr. Barksdale: I object to "B" because the sole evi-
dence in this case is that it was caused by a pyogenic infection 
with and through the wound. It is misleading- and confusing 
to the jury and there is no testimony in this case that it was 
caused by anything on earth except pyogenic inf·ection. This 
instruction tells them if it was caused by any other bacteria 
then there can be no recovery. · 
By the .Court : I am inclined to give '' B' '. 
By Mr. Barksdale: The plaintiff excepts to the giving of 
instruction "B" because there is no evidence upon 
page 56 } which the instruction can be based and it is only 
operative to confuse the jury. 
By the Court: I am going to give "B-1", "E", "F" and 
''H". I am refusing "I". 
By Mr. Caskie: We except to the refusal of the Court to 
give instruction "I" on the ground that it properly sets out 
the law in the terms of the policy and from the evidence. 
By Mr. Barksdale: I am now offering instruction '' 3-A' '. 
By Mr. Caskie: We object to instruction "3-A'' on the 
grounds that in the first place it is not responsive to the 
issues here. Not only as to all disability but his inability 
to do any and all of the acts provided in the policy. Another 
objection is that there is no evidence here to substantiate · 
the fact that he was unable to do any of his work. He couldn't 
do it exactly as he did before but he did it all and there is 
no evidence he didn't do it. He worked there for five days. 
By Mr. Frost: I want to add a further objection. In 
Schedule 2, of the policy it provides for continuous and total 
disability and further provides that such injury should 
prevent the assured from the 'date of accident from doing 
any and every duty pertainin~ .to his work. This instruction 
emphasizes part of the prov1s1on of Schedule 2, and leaves 
out the other feature. 
page 57 } By the Court: I think I will give instruction 
"3-A ". 
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By Mr. Frost: We note an exception for the reasons 
stated. 
Note: At this point it was agreed that interest on ·the 
amount sued for should be .calculated from September 8th, 
1935. 
.... INSTRUCTION NO. 1 (Given) . 
The court instructs the jury that if you believe from the 
evidence that while the insurance policy here sued on was in 
force the plaintiff, Ray S. Harris; suffered accidental bodily 
injury; that as the sole, direct result of such injury, in con-
nection with pus forming infection which occurred with and 
through the accidental bruise or wound suffered by the plain-
tiff, the plaintiff was totally disabled as set out in plaintiff's 
notice. of· motion and treatment and residence in Memorial 
Hospital was necessitated as set out in plaintiff's notice of 
motion, then you should find for the plaintiff in the. sum of 
$931.40; with interest thereon from September· 8, 1935, the 
date on which sum became due. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 (Given). 
The court instructs the jury that the word ''accidental'' as . 
used in the insurance policy here sued on Waf? used in the 
ordinary, popular ·sense as meaning happening by chance, 
unexpectedly taking place, not according to the usual course 
of things, or not as expected. Therefore, if you 
page 58 } believe from the evidence that McHenry Peters in· 
a playful or jesting spirit unintentionally bruised 
plaintiff's neck, which caused an unforeseen, unexpected, or 
unusual result, then the injury has resulted through· accidental 
means. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3-A (Given). 
The court instructs the jury that ''total disability''· as used 
in the policy does not mean a state of· absolute helplessness, 
but it mearis inability to do all the substantial and material 
acts ·necessary to the proseci1tion of the insured's business 
or ·occupation in his customary and usual manner. 
JNS'rRUOTION NO. 4 (Given). 
The Court instructs the jury that if you· believe from the 
evidence that the plaintiff, Ray S. Harris, within twenty 
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days of the time of his injury, became so ill as to necessitate 
hospitalization and several surgical operations, and that the 
plaintiff from time to time during this period was delirious, · 
and that by reason of his condition it was not reasonably 
possible to give the preliminary notice to the insurance com-
pany within twenty days fro1n date of injury as specified 
in the policy, and that the plaintiff gave such notice. through 
· his physician, Dr. W. C. Adkerson, as soon there-
page 59 t after as if was reasonably possible, then such no-
tice was sufficient, and the delay in giving the no-
tice constitutes no defense to this action. 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRU·CTION A (Given). 
. The· Court instructs the jury that the policy sued on in 
this cause was a contract made between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, under the terms of which the defendant is obli-
gated to make payments upon certain terms and conditions 
as set out in the policy, and the plaintiff is obligated on his 
part, in order to avail of his claim, to perform certain ob-
ligations and duties, the policy being subject to the provisions 
and limitations contained in and endorsed on said policy. 
One of the said conditions is that ''written notice of injury 
on which claim may be based must be given to the Company 
within twenty days after the date of the accident causing 
such injury". The Court therefore instructs you that it was 
the duty of the plaintiff, in order to avail of his claim, to give 
the company. written notice within twenty days after the date 
of the accident causing the injury, and he must have given 
such not~ce, unless you find that it was not reasonably pos-
sible for him to g·ive such notice, and that such notice was 
in fact given as soon as was reasonably possible for him to 
do so. · 
page 60 t DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION B (Given). 
The Court instructs the jury that under the terms of the 
policy sued on, it' is specifically provided that the policy ''does 
not cover any accidental bodily injury caused or contributed 
tQ, directly or indirectly, by sickness or disease, or by pto-
maine or bacterial infections (except pyogenic infections 
which shall occur with and through an accidental cut or 
woun4) '~ .. Therefore, you are instructed that if you believe 
from the evidence that the bodily injury complained of in 
this action was carbuncles and cellulitis and that the said 
carbuncles and cellulitis .are bacterial infections, and that 
the bodily injury complained of 'vas caused or contributed 
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to, either directly or indirectly by such bacterial infection, 
then the said injury was not cov.ered under the policy and 
. you must find for the defendant, unless you believe from the 
evidence that such bacterial infection was also a pyogenic in-
fection and occurred with or through an accidental cut or 
wound. 
DFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION B-1 (Given). 
The Court instructs the jury that pyogenic infections are 
infections which develop or secrete pus, and the injuries 
in this case are therefore pyogenic. If you believe from the 
evidence that though there were a wound yet if it was not an 
accidental one, then there can be no recovery. A cut or wound 
is not accidental if it was the natural and prob-
page 61 ~ able result of a deliberate act of a third party, 
and not ·an unusual or an unexpected· result. If 
you find, therefore, that there was either a cut or wound 
(and a bruise is classified as a wound) on the neck of the 
plaintiff, and such wound 'vas the natural and probable result 
of the act ,of the third party in grasping the neck of the plain-
tiff, then there can be no recovery, e:ven though the carbuncles 
and cellulitis might be classified as an accident. 
DEFENDANT'S INSTR1JCTION E (Given). 
The Co~rt instructs the jury that in order to entitle the 
plaintiff to recover in this case he must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the injuries of which he has com-
plained are covered under the terms of the policy, and also 
do not come within the exceptions of such coverage, and 
must further show by such preponderance that he has com-
plied with the duties and obligations imposed on him under 
the terms of the policy. 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION F (Given) 
The Court instructs the jury that the plaintiff is not en-
titled to recover in this case except for injuries resulting 
from an accident, and if you believe from the evidence that 
the injuries of the plaintiff did not result from an accident, 
then you must find for the defendant. 
page 62 ~ DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION H (Given). 
The Court instructs the jury that in considering this case, 
you should consider it purely on the evidence as given from . 
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the witness stand and the law as laid down in the instruc-
tions, and not to allow any question of sympathy to enter 
into your deliberations in determining your verdict. 
INSTRUCTIONS REFUSED. 
DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION A-1 (Refused). 
The Court instructs the jury" that the obligation to give 
notice as set out in Instruction A, was a personal obligation 
of the plaintiff, and if you believe from the evidence that he 
attempted by writing a letter on May 9th to give notice, and 
delivered that notice to Dr. Adkerson,. his physician, for 
delivery to the agent of the Insurance Company, then the 
said Dr. Adkerson was the agent of ·the plaintiff, Harris, 
and any failure of the said Dr. Adkerson to deliver the no-
tice was the failure of the plaintiff himself, and if you be-
lieve from the evidence that the notice did not reach the 
agent of the Insurance Company as soon as it was reason-
ably possible for the plaintiff to have given it, then the said 
notice was not given within the time provided by the policy, 
and you must find for the defendant. 
page 63 } DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION I (Refused). 
The Court instructs the jury that, reg·ardless of what con-
clusions you may reach on the issues in this case, you can-
not find for the plaintiff Ray S. Harris, unless the alleged in-
jury shall have caused continuous total disability and have 
prevented the insured from date of the alleged accident from 
performing any and every duty pertaining to his occupation, 
and therefore, if you believe from the evidence that the al-
leged injury occurred on the 28th or 29th day of March, 
1935, and that RayS. Harris, the plaintiff, continued to work 
as Deputy Auditor of the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, until 
April 5, 1935, then you shall find for the defendant, the Glens 
Fall Indemnity Company. 
PLAINTIFF'S INSTRUCTION NO. 3 (Refused). 
· The Court instructs the jury that the evidence in this case 
in regard to the giving of preliminary notice and filing proof 
of loss being without conflict you are instructed that as a 
matter of law the preliminary notice given aii.d proof of loss 
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filed constituted substantial compliance with the terms of the 
policy here sued on, and neither the delay in giving the pre-
liminary notice· nor in filing proof of loss constitutes any le-
gal defense to this action. 
page 64 ~ Note: The case having been fully argued by 
counsel the jury retired to their room and after 
some .deliber~tion brought in the following verdict: 
"We, the jury, find for the plaintiff in the sum of $931.40 
with interest thereon from September 8th, 1935. 
L. l(UNZ, Foreman.'' 
By Mr. Caskie: 'If your Honor please, we want to move 
the Court to set the verdict of the jury aside on the grounds 
that it is contrary to the law and the evidence; for the errors 
.of the court in giving and refusing instructions; and for the 
points that have been argued. 
By the Court: The Court is very much of the same opin-
ion it was when it overruled the motion to strike the evidence 
and doesn't think any errors of law have been committed 
and the statement of facts was for the jury. Therefore the 
motion is overruled. 
By Mr. Caskie : We 'vould like to note an exception and 
ask the Court for the usual stay of sixty days. 
By the Court: It 'vill be suspended for sixty days . 
• 
page 65 ~ CERTIFICATE. 
I, Don P. Halsey, Judge of the Circuit. Court for the City 
of Lynchburg, at Lynchburg, Virginia, who presided over 
the trial of the case of RayS. Harris v. Glens Falls Indem-
nity Company, to the record, testimony and other incidents 
of which said trial this certificate is attached, do hereby certify 
that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of all testimony, 
agreements and other incidents which were introduced or 
that occurred during said trial, including all instructions 
requested, amended, given and refused and questions raised, 
and all rulings thereon, including- exceptions, grounds of ob-
jections to the admission and exclusion of evidence, and of 
the refusal of the motion to strike out the evidence with a 
statement of the grounds of said motion. 
I do further certify that the said case was tried in tbe 
Circuit Court for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, on the 
24th day of February, 1936, and it appears in writing that 
· Glens Falls Indem¢ty Co., v. Ray S. Harris 57 
the plaintiff, RayS. Harris, by his attorney, has had reason-
able notice of the time and place when this testimony and 
other incidents of trial would be tendered and presented to 
the undersigned for certification, which is certified within sixty 
days after final judgment. 
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of April, 1936. 
DON P. HALSEY, (Seal) 
Judge of the Circuit Court for the City of 
Lynchburg, Virginia. 
Filed in Clerk's office of Circuit Court of City of Lynch· 
burg, Va., April 11, 1936. . 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, Clerk. 
page 66 ~ And now at this day, to-wit, at Lynchburg Cir-
. cuit ·Court, February 24th, 1936, the date first here-
inbefore mentioned. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys, and the de-
fendant for plea says that it did not undertake and promise 
in manner and form as the plaintiff in his notice of motion 
for judgment against it has complaied, and of this it puts 
itself upon the country, and the plaintiff likewise. And said 
defendant having filed a statement of the grounds of its 
defense on the 19th day of February, 1936, as heretofore or-
dered by the court, the plaintiff replies generally to the same, 
and prays that the same be inquired of by the country, and 
the defendant likewise. And the plaintiff filed by leave of 
court a bill of the particulars of his claim as heretofore or-
dered by the court, and the defendant moved the court to 
strike out certain portions of said bill of particulars, which 
motion the court doth sustain, upon the admission of the de-
fendant by counsel that proof of loss was filed in time under 
the terms of the policy, whereupon certain portions of said 
bill of particulars were stricken out, and said plaintiff re-
plies generally to said amended bill of particulars, and prays 
that the same be inquired of by the country, and said plain-
tiff likewise. And said parties demanding a jury, and con-
senting that the same shall consist of five jurors, there came 
a jury, to-wit, ·G. G. Campbell, Geo. C. Coleman, Dudley M. 
Jones, Lynwood Kunz and E. M. Bunch, who were sworn to 
try the issue joined, and having fully heard the evidence 
the defendant by its attorneys moved the court to 
page 67 ~ strike out the plaintiff's evidence on the ground 
that said evidence does not show that the plaintiff 
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was continuously disabled from performing his usual occu-
pation from the date of the accident; on the further ground 
that the notice was not given within the time provided for 
by the policy in that it was not given as soon as was reason-
abJy possible for the plaintiff to give it; as disclosed by the 
evidence and required by the policy; on the further gro'und 
that plaintiff's injuries which were followed or contributed 
to directly, or indirectly, by bacterial infections which are 
specifically excepted from the policy, and it does not come 
within the exception to the exception dealing with pyogenic 
infection, because the injury or wound was not an accidental 
injury or 'vound, but was one that was deliberately inflicted 
through the deliberate act of a third party; on the further 
ground that this is an accident policy covering only accidental 
bodily injuries and the evidence discloses that the injuries 
were not the result of an accident but the result of a de-
liberate act of a third party; and on the further ground that 
the injuries complained of ·were not tho.se includ~d u.nder any 
of the terms of the policy sued on; and said motion being 
fully argued, the court doth overrule the same, and the said 
defendant by. its attorneys excepted. Thereupon the jury 
aforesaid having fully heard the evidence and argument of 
counsel, returned the following verdict, to-wit: "We the jury 
find for the plaintiff in the sum of $931.40 with interest there-
on from September 8th, 1935, L. Kunz, Foreman.'' There-
upon the defendant by its attorneys moved the court to set 
aside said verdict and grant it a new trial on the 
page 68 ~ ground that said verdict is contrary to the law and 
the evidence, and on the further ground .of errors 
of the court in the giving and refusing of certain instructions, 
which said motion the court overruled and the said defendant 
by its attorneys excepted. It is therefore considered by the 
court that the plaintiff recover against the said defendant, 
Glens Falls Indemnity Company (a corporation) of Glens 
Falls, New York, the sum of $931.40, with legal interest 
thereon from September 8th, 1935, until paid, the damag.es 
by the jurors in their verdict aforesaid ascertained and as-
sessed, and his costs by him about his motion in this behalf 
expended. . 
At the instance of the defendant, which, by its attorneys, in-
timated its desire to present a petition for a writ of error 
and supersedeas, it is ordered that the execution of the fore-
going . judgment· be. suspended for a period of sixty days, 
p~ovided that said defendant or someone for it shall execute 
l}efore the clerk of this court a proper suspending bond in 
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pag·e 69 ~ I, Hubert H. Martin, clerk of the .circuit court 
of the city of Lynchburg, do certify that the fore-
going is a true transcript of the record of the case of Ray S. 
Harris v. Glens Falls Indemnity Company, a corporation, 
and I further certify that notices as required by Section 
6253-f and Section 6339 of the Code were duly given as ap-
pears by a paper writing filed with the record of said case. 
The fee for making this transcript is $15.00. 
Given under my hand this 11th day of April, 1936. 
HUBERT H. MARTIN, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste : 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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